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EVALUATING LEADERSHIP’S APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTING 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ACROSS THE NAVAL AVIATION 








NAVAIR is currently realigning its aviation maintenance infrastructure to fall 
under the overarching umbrella of the newly minted Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE).   
This realignment will call for a new enterprise-wide strategy and structure.  Hierarchies 
and relationships are being redefined throughout the enterprise, resulting in entirely new 
organizational structures that are functionally equivalent to industry’s small business 
units.  This realignment, which will eliminate Intermediate level maintenance as it exists 
today, presents a myriad of challenges to the Fleet in the terms of achieving business 
efficiencies and employee relationship management.  This MBA Project evaluates, by 
survey, how effectively the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps have managed the change 
effort as they continue to realign their Intermediate and Depot level units under the new 
FRC construct. 
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Over the past five years, the United States Navy and Marine Corps have 
endeavored to achieve a myriad of efficiencies through their respective organizations, 
ultimately trying to bring all facets of Naval aviation under one overarching enterprise 
concept called the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE).  The NAE is an attempt to resolve 
issues facing Naval aviation on an “enterprise-wide basis”.  As part of the submission to 
the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC), Navy leadership began to 
rethink how it manages its aviation maintenance operations.  Leadership concluded that 
integration of the Naval Aviation Depots (NADEP) with the CONUS Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Detachments (AIMD) could produce meaningful efficiencies 
in maintenance operations. This resulted in the creation of Fleet Readiness Centers 
(FRC).  Aside from structural changes to both these organizations, the plan calls for the 
elimination of traditional Intermediate level maintenance practices and redefines the 
workflow from the Organizational to the Depot level.  Leadership intends to “align and 
streamline the production capability and capacity of the Depots with the AIMDs into a 
single off-aircraft maintenance provider”.1  This MBA Project examines the change 
process within this large and complex organization through the evaluation of a survey 
administered to 247 aviation maintenance personnel.  Results indicate that members of 
the Navy have been better informed and feel more positive toward the changes than 
members of the Marine Corp.  Factors contributing to knowledge relevant to the new 
processes and attitude toward the change include perceived urgency, incentives tied to the 
change, leadership support, and informal communication about the change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This study identifies organizational change elements and principles necessary for 
promoting Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) success in a hierarchical organization that is 
undergoing and still planning to undergo change.  This study conducted a survey of 
aviation maintenance personnel and through applied research identified key items for 
improved change process.  This study can provide a look into and a reference or guideline 
for change in similar hierarchical organizations. 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides a background on the traditional structure and design of 
Naval aviation maintenance and an overview of traditional operating concepts to give an 
understanding of the way aviation maintenance is structured.  This structure is provided 
to give a reference to understand the shift from three levels of maintenance to the two 
levels proposed by combining the Intermediate and Depot levels of aviation maintenance.  
 
1. Aviation Maintenance Structure and Design Overview 
The traditional design of Naval aviation maintenance activities involved vertical 
integration of its infrastructure, with independent organizations having formally 
established hierarchies as dictated by the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, 
(NAMP).  Personnel within the infrastructure were assigned legitimate power and 
authority commensurate with their ranks and positions.  Leaders used their assigned 
power to direct work assignments and allocate resources to accomplish their mission.  As 
related to the maintenance function for which an organization was responsible, each 
leader exercised a relatively narrow span of control.  To assist in accomplishing the 
mission, many processes were standardized to ensure compliance with written directives 
and instructions.   
The tall structure contained many layers of management, lending itself to 
centralized decision making.  This centralized decision making was accomplished even 
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though aviation maintenance units are geographically separated due to world wide 
deployments, a permanent overseas presence and forward operating bases.   
 
2. Traditional NAVAL Aviation Maintenance Operating Concepts 
Overview 
Naval aviation maintenance has traditionally been performed across three distinct 
levels; Organizational, Intermediate and Depot.  Guidance for both the structure of these 
organizations and their maintenance practices is addressed in the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program (NAMP).  The NAMP is sponsored and directed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations2 (CNO), in coordination with the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
3(CMC).  A recent change to the NAMP has made Commander Naval Air Forces, 
(COMNAVAIRFOR) 4 the cognizant activity exercising control over all subordinate 
aviation organizations.  Previously, two organizations exercised similar control over the 
aviation enterprise, but with geographically divided responsibilities; Commander Naval 
Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL), exercised control over all activities assigned to the Atlantic 
region, and Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP), exercised control over all 
Pacific assets.  In spite of their divided responsibilities, CNAP held primary authority for 
oversight of both Atlantic and Pacific maintenance operations.  In practice, this division 
of responsibility was tantamount to a degree of decentralized control that resulted in 
dissimilar maintenance procedures – a problem the NAE intended to correct.  To 
eliminate this problem, both CNAP and CNAL were put under the consolidated control 
of COMNAVAIRFOR in 2006.  This resulted in a change in the Naval aviation’s primary 
maintenance directive from the OPNAVINST 4790.2 to the COMNAVAIRFORINST 
4790.2.     
The new COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2 has become the primary instruction 
that offers guidance to all aviation maintenance organizations subject to executing the 
NAMP.  It contains specific guidance on concepts, policies, organizational structures, 
                                                 
2 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 2005, Ch 1 par 1.1. 
3 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 2005, Ch 1 par 1.1. 
4 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 2005, Ch 7 par 7.1. 
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maintenance, data processing, and standard operating procedures.  The 
COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2 is organized into five volumes.  Volume I addresses 
concepts, policies, organizations, maintenance support procedures, and Organizational 
level (O-level) and Intermediate level (I-level) maintenance.  Volume II addresses 
concepts, policies, organizations, and support procedures for Depot level (D-level) 
maintenance.  Volume III addresses the Maintenance Data System (MDS).  Volume IV 
addresses aviation maintenance (3M) data processing requirements.  Volume V addresses 
NAMP Standard Operating Procedures. 
 
a. The Three Levels of Maintenance 
The Organizational, Intermediate and Depot levels of aviation 
maintenance are distinct.  The following briefly discusses the basic concepts of each level 
of maintenance.   
1. Organizational (O) Level Maintenance.  Organizational 
level maintenance is performed by an operating unit on a day-to-day basis in support of 
its own operations.  O-level maintenance maintains assigned aircraft and aeronautical 
equipment in a full mission capable status while continually improving the local 
maintenance process.  While O-level maintenance may be done by I-level or D-level 
activities, O-level maintenance is usually accomplished by maintenance personnel 
assigned to aircraft reporting custodians5.   O-level maintenance functions generally can 
be grouped under the categories of inspections, servicing, handling, on-equipment 
corrective and preventive maintenance, incorporation of Technical Directives, record 
keeping and reports preparation6.   
The O-level organization is broken down into different O-level 
maintenance structures with both Line and Staff Relationships contained within.   
 
 
                                                 
5 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 2005, Ch 7 par 7.1.1. 




Figure 1.   O-Level Maintenance Department Line and Staff Relationships (Navy)7 
 
                                                 









                                                 
8 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 200,5 Ch 8 Fig 8-2. 
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2. Intermediate (I) Level Maintenance.  The purpose of I-level 
maintenance is to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission capability of 
supported activities by providing quality and timely material support at the nearest 
location with the lowest practical resource expenditure9.  I-level maintenance consists of 
on and off equipment material support and encompasses maintenance on aeronautical 
components and related Support Equipment, Fleet Calibration Activities, processing 
aircraft components from stricken aircraft, providing technical assistance to supported 
units, incorporation of Technical Directives,  manufacture of selected aeronautical 
components, liquids, gases, as well as the performance of on-aircraft maintenance10.  
The organization of I-level maintenance is broken down into three 
different Line and Staff relationships across Navy Ashore, Navy Afloat, and deployable 
Marine Corps units. 
 
 
                                                 
9 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 2005, Ch 7 par 7.1.2. 
10 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 2005, Ch 7 par 7.1.2b 1-8. 
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Figure 3.   I-Level Maintenance Department/Detachment Organization (Navy Ashore)11 
                                                 




Figure 4.   I-Level Maintenance Department/Detachment Organization (Navy Afloat)12 
 
 
                                                 









                                                 
13 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2 ,Volume I, 1 February 2005, Ch 8 Fig 8-7. 
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b. Depot (D) Level Maintenance 
D-level maintenance is performed at or by Naval aviation industrial 
establishments to ensure continued integrity and serviceability of airframes and flight 
systems during subsequent operational service periods14.  D-level maintenance is also 
performed on material requiring major overhaul or the rebuilding of parts, assemblies, 
subassemblies, and end-items. It includes manufacturing parts, modifying, testing, 
inspecting, sampling, and reclamation. D-level maintenance supports O-level and I-level 
maintenance by providing engineering assistance and performing maintenance beyond 
their capabilities.   The D-level maintenance can be grouped under the categories of 
aircraft scheduled for D-level maintenance, D-level rework, calibration by Navy 
calibration laboratories, incorporation of Technical Directives, modifications, 
manufacture or modification of parts or kits, technical and engineering assistance by field 
teams, and Age Exploration of aircraft and equipment15.  
                                                 
14 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I, 1 February 200, 5 Ch 7 par 7.1.3a. 
15 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume I ,1 February 2005, Ch 7 par 7.1.3b 1-8. 
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The D-level organization is broken down as depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.   Naval Air Depot Organizational Chart16 
 
B. PURPOSE   
The purpose of this study is to focus on elements of organizational change 
deemed critical to the effective implementation of FRCs.  These elements include aspects 
of leadership, incentives, communication, and conveyance of urgency to organization 
members in the Navy and Marines.  Following statistical analyses, the study develops a 
change model to help guide the NAE’s implementation of FRCs.   
 
                                                 
16 COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, Volume II, 1 February 2005, Ch 2 Fig 2-1. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What organizational change elements and principles are necessary for promoting 
Naval Aviation Enterprise success within a hierarchical organization? 
 
D. STUDY BENEFIT  
1. This study is intended to formulate an organizational change model that 
can provide a reference or guideline for change in similar hierarchical organizations 
undergoing change or planning to undergo change.   
2. This study is also intended to provide recommendations to assist the NAE 
with its implementation of FRCs.    
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II. THE NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE 
This chapter will provide information on the background of the Naval Aviation 
Enterprise (NAE) and discuss the evolving organizational structure, explain the concept 
of reduced costs derived from a more capable repair source, benefits of integration, and 
leadership design and direction.   
 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) began as a strategic vision intended to help 
align the mission of all organizations within an enterprise concept that would ultimately 
lead to a single congruent direction for Naval aviation.  While some elements of the 
strategy were implemented as early as 1998, the NAE has been an evolving strategy that 
did not materialize in the Fleet until 2001.  Two major forces drove the development of 
the NAE; first, the introduction of a Fleet Response Plan (FRP) that required greater 
flexibility and increased capabilities of operational forces, and second, the need to 
capture business efficiencies of adequate scale to address a growing recapitalization 
problem without requiring a significant increase in DoD funding.  The concept is that if 
the DoD can save funds through mandated BRAC changes like the implementation of 
FRCs, Naval aviation could ostensibly use the saved funds to help recapitalize the aging 
fleet.  Older aircraft are much more costly to maintain than newer aircraft.  The average 
age of an aircraft today is closing in on twenty years as seen in figure 7.   The NAE’s 
stated goal is “to deliver the right readiness, at the right cost, at the right time.”17  
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20-year-old aircraft are very costly to maintain . . .  















Figure 7.   Aging Fleet in Need of Recapitalization18 
 
The NAE has many business change processes underway.  Among these are the 
Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP), AIRSpeed, 
Depot AIRSpeed, Enterprise AIRSpeed, and NAVAIR AIRSpeed.  NAVRIIP and 
AIRSpeed are realizations of new efficiencies which will incorporate world-class 
logistics practices.  These programs are geared toward reducing costs and improving 
efficiencies through the use of commercial business practices.  
Leading up to the 2005 BRAC, the Navy felt the need to transform how it 
implemented its off-flight line maintenance functions by removing the distinctions 
between Intermediate and Depot level maintenance activities.  Off-flight line 
maintenance is when components of an aircraft have been removed from the aircraft on 
the flight-line to be repaired at the next higher level of maintenance.  The theory was that 
removing these distinctions would lead to an optimized infrastructure that would 
ultimately yield reduced operating costs through a combination of reduced repair costs 
                                                 
18 NAVAIR AIRspeed overview Brief, NAVAIR, October 2004. 
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and increased reliability.  This concept would require a transformation to both existing 
organizational structures and job design.  Further, it would require a new approach on 
how Navy and Marine Corps operational commanders view their readiness requirements.   
At the most basic level, combining the Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) and 
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Detachments (AIMDs) would “require engineers and 
logisticians to update maintenance plans, repair procedures and specifications that will 
remove work content, eliminate “white space” and require less material and labor while 
improving product output (reliability).”19  Additionally, the enterprise-wide use of 
NAVRIIP and AIRSpeed best practices will be crucial to the realization of new 
efficiencies. 
The integration of the AIMDs and Depots will culminate in the creation of Fleet 
Readiness Centers (FRCs).  The FRCs will create cohesion between two previously 
separated organizations.  Under the umbrella of a single organization, there will be more 
complex interdependencies.  Now more than ever before, it will be common place to find 
Sailors, Marines, civil servants and artisans working side-by-side in integrated work 
centers.  This will require a comprehensive change to existing command organizational 
structures, as well as reporting relationships and funding requirements. 
 
1. The Evolving Organizational Structure 
Prior to the implementation of the FRC concept the Navy utilized three distinct 
levels of maintenance to maintain its fleet of aircraft; Organizational - performed at the 
squadron level, Intermediate - a deeper depth of repair performed off the aircraft, and 
finally, and Depot level maintenance - which involved the most in-depth repairs and 
skilled artisans.  The Intermediate level of maintenance was performed by the AIMDs.  
The reporting relationship for the AIMD was typified by Figure 8.   
 
                                                 






Figure 8.   Historical Reporting Relationship 
 
Under this scenario, the AIMDs functioned as departments of a Naval Air Station.  
Heading up the AIMD was a Department Head that reported to the air station’s 
Commanding Officer.  This pit the AIMD in direct competition with the station’s other 
departments for scarce resources and funding.   
The next iteration of change came in late 2001 when the AIMDs were realigned 
with existing Type Wings20.  This broke the AIMDs away from the air stations, fleeted 
the AIMD’s Department Head up to the position of Officer in Charge (OIC) and 
established a reporting relationship to the Commodore of the Type Wing as illustrated in 
Figure 9. 
                                                 
20 Type Wing – A single command having responsibility for all like type, model and series aircraft and 
commands under the Type Wing commander. 
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Figure 9.   Type Wing Iteration 
 
The resulting structure was advantageous for a number of reasons.  First, it 
maintained the three-level maintenance concept already familiar throughout the Fleet.  
Second, by virtue of the newly created position of OIC, the AIMDs were empowered to 
handle the administration of discipline without relying on the non-judicial actions of air 
station Commanding Officers.  This increase in authority not only had the potential to 
raise the morale of both the officers and enlisted, but to empowered the AIMDs, allowing 
them to establish their own unique command climates reflective of their OIC’s stated 
vision and goals.  Third, the AIMDs gained better control over their personnel.  Out of all 
the departments within an air station, the AIMDs were assigned the largest number of 
troops.  The AIMDs’ manpower numbers were not large without reason, but in response 
to manpower studies which analyzed the organization’s mission, functions and tasking.  
This large pool of manpower made the AIMDs an attractive target when air stations 
experienced emergent tasking that required a significant number of people.  Arbitrary 
tasking by the station was never a design element in the manpower studies; hence 
improper utilization of the AIMDs’ manpower had severe negative consequences.  This 
resulted in a conflict in priorities.  The AIMDs’ mandate was to maintain the operational 
readiness of an aging fleet of aircraft, not cut grass or direct traffic.   
Many of the detailed aspects of the new FRC organization are still unresolved.  
While the final organizational structure may be reflected by Figure 10, what is now know 
is that the majority of the new FRCs will be commanded by either Navy Captains or 
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Marine Corp Colonels with approximately two FRCs being commanded by either 
Commanders or Lieutenant Colonels.  This will potentially result in the removing or 
reshaping of the existing Commander level OIC billets now held at the AIMDs and 
stripping them of some of their autonomy.   
 
Figure 10.   Potential FRC Organization 
 
Perhaps the most significant change under the new FRC concept will be the 
integration of Intermediate and Depot level maintenance functions and the movement of 
some of the D-level capability to the I-level in order to create an optimized two-level 
maintenance concept instead of the current three maintenance levels.  Still unknown is 
how these previously distinct maintenance levels will interact and interface.  Most 
AIMDs and Depot facilities are not co-located on the same base further exacerbating the 
difficulty with integration.  
Six FRCs will be created requiring the consolidation of numerous commands and 
detachments.  In contrast to the ashore AIMDs, afloat AIMDs will affiliate with an ashore 
FRC, but will retain their existing command structure as a department within the ship and 
not report directly to a FRC Commanding Officer (CO) but to the ship’s CO.  The FRCs 
will consist of FRC Northwest, FRC West, FRC Southwest, FRC Mid Atlantic, FRC East 
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Figure 11.   Potential Organization of Fleet Readiness Centers21 
 
The Navy has indicated its commitment to this change and has created a Rear 
Admiral billet of “Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers”.  The six commanders of the 
FRCs will report to the Commander, FRCs.  This reflects considerable commitment to 
the aviation maintenance community, which currently has two flag level officers.   
 
2. Concept of Reduced Cost from a More Capable Repair Source 
Approximately 30% of the material that passes through and AIMD is classified as 
Beyond Capable Maintenance (BCM) of the AIMDs.  Seventy percent of this material 
can typically be processed for repair at a NADEP.  The initial model indicates that 40 
percent of the components diverted for commercial repair could actually be repaired at an 
AIMD with the introduction of Depot level skills.  This would have the effect of 
increasing the AIMDs’ overall repair rates, eliminating 25 percent of the total material 
previously designated as BCM.  The model only holds true as long as interdicted repairs 
                                                 
21 Don Fathke & Bob Buckley, Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) Transformation A Systems Approach, 
September 2005.  
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cost less than designating the material as BCM and utilizing commercial repair or 
replacement options. 
It is also anticipated that by the introduction of more advanced skill sets at lower 
levels, vis-à-vis the Depot level artisans, the overall quality of maintenance practices will 
increase.  This has the potential to reduced rework requirements and increase component 
and system reliability. 
 
3. Benefits of Integration 
Integration offers the added benefit of creating more agile learning organizations.  
Where process improvements may have impacted a confined part of the overall enterprise 
effort, the increased vertical integration will assist in information sharing allowing 
previously disconnected levels of the organization to capitalize on the concept of “Best 
Practices”.  
The overall benefit of developing these agile learning organizations should be 
reduced cycle time for components in the repair process which should ultimately lead to a 
decrease in required material inventory and ultimately – cost savings.  Corresponding 
decreases in transportation, storage, and repair equipment should be realized as well.        
 
4. Leadership Design and Directions   
Cross functional teams have been established to design architecture, concept of 
operations and plan of action and milestones for implementation.  Provisional standup of 
headquarters and subordinate elements are to be completed by October 2006. 
 
B. THE FRC CONCEPT AS A MACHINE 
1. To think of an organization as a machine is to think of it purely as set of 
structures and processes designed to perform a task.  For the FRC, that task is performing 
“off flight-line” maintenance. This is not hard to conceptualize, as most military 
organizations are viewed as machines.22 However, this view can lead to some interesting 
                                                 
22 Morgan Gareth, Images of Organization, 2006, Page 16, 18. 
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conclusions about the implementation of a strategy.  Various briefs and published 
documents support the notion that the FRC concept was planned from a mechanistic 
approach.  Because aviation maintenance does not meet the criteria for this approach, the 
reorganization may lead to serious unintended consequences.  Among these is the 
possibility that the FRC will be less responsive to a dynamic environment. 
2. By using the mechanistic approach, the FRCs can become tools to be 
managed.  They are parts or “boxes” which make the Naval aviation maintenance 
“machine” work.  Viewed mechanistically, it becomes fairly easy to apply Morgan’s 
views on Fredrick Taylor’s Scientific Management Principles to the management of the 
FRCs.23 
• Shift all responsibility for the organization of work from the worker to the 
manager.  The organization of the FRCs consolidates control over 
maintenance activities to fewer and higher ranking Aviation Maintenance 
Officers.  It brings maintenance activities up to a level where the Chief of 
Naval Air Forces (CNAF) has greater visibility and control than ever 
before. 
• Use scientific methods to determine the most efficient way of doing work.  
NAE Leadership has been pushing implementation of Lean Six-Sigma and 
other private sector business programs to improve efficiencies.  
• Select the best person to perform the job thus designed.  The NAE is using 
a Human Capital Strategy to attract and retain the right mix people and 
skills at the lower levels.24 CNAF has directed one of the main architects 
of the FRC plan, RADM Hardee, to become head of the FRC 
organization.   
• Train the worker to do the work efficiently.  The intent of the plan is that 
by having young sailors working alongside experienced civilian artisans; 
they will learn trade skills quicker and more effectively than in an all-
military organization. 
• Monitor worker performance. The FRCs will monitor inventory levels, 
work in process, cycle times, and cost through the use of a myriad of 
AIRspeed tools.   
3. The machine metaphor can be taken one step further and be applied to the 
transformation process as well.  A good example would be the introduction of Six-Sigma 
                                                 
23 Morgan Gareth, Images of Organization, 2006, Page.22, 23. 
24 Naval Aviation Vision 2020, Page 108-113. 
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techniques to maintenance processes to delegate authority.  The idea is that if the Six-
Sigma process worked well at G.E. or Motorola, then it should work just as well 
throughout the FRC organizations.  CNAF also designated himself as the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the NAE, and his lieutenants the Chief Operations Officer (COO) and 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO).  The six FRC commanders will be like G.E.'s “Industry 
Partners”.  The concept is being duplicated based on successful organizational change 
efforts in the private sector and utilizing them in Naval Aviation.  The expectation is that 
they will perform in a similar manner.  The NAE has gone so far as to train its own Six-
Sigma experts called “Black belts”, a name first used by G.E.’s experts. 
4. Morgan goes on to qualify the use of the mechanistic approach with an 
organization.  In order for the approach to work, the following conditions must exist:25 
• The task to be performed is straightforward 
• The environment is stable enough that the products produced are 
appropriate 
• The products produced are the same 
• Precision is at a premium 
• The human “machine” parts are compliant and behave as they have been 
designed to do 
5. It may be difficult for aviation maintenance, even off-flight line 
maintenance, to fit into these conditions.  These facilities do not produce any actual 
products.  They merely repair equipment.  Further, no two repairs, inspections, or 
upgrades will be exactly the same repetitive assembly line repair. Aviation maintenance 
is accomplished in a job-shop environment, which requires highly customized and 
flexible operations.  Little stability exists in this environment. 
6. In a recent brief, CNAF’s CEO stated that the organization’s culture is 
“the collective behavior of the leaders”26, implying that if senior leaders set the tone, 
junior personnel will simply fall in line.  
                                                 
25 Morgan Gareth, Images of Organization, 2006, Page.27. 
26 VADM Zortman and VADM Massenburg, “Naval Aviation Enterprise: A Warfighting Partnership”, 
brief for the Naval Aviation Enterprise – Investment Alignment Symposium, 8 March 2006. 
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This leads to the limitations of the mechanistic approach. These include:27 
• Creates organizational forms which have difficulty in adapting to change 
• Can result in mindless and unquestioning bureaucracy 
• Can lead to the interests of those working in the organization taking 
precedence over the goals the organization was designed to achieve 
• Can have dehumanizing effects upon employees, especially at lower levels 
 
7. There may also be some serious unintended human capital consequences 
of the plan.  Under the old structure, AIMDs were staffed by two distinct groups of 
sailors; those on shore duty and those on sea duty.  Both groups were exposed to similar 
training and tasking in the workplace.  Under the FRC, AIMDs will now be staffed by 
sailors on sea duty who will comprise a Sea Operational Detachment (SEAOPDET).  We 
have to assume that these sailors may receive additional benefit from working side by 
side with Depot level artisans.  This could have two-fold consequences on a sailor’s 
career.  First, the reduction in shore duty billets will result in longer sea-shore rotation of 
our forces – a significant quality of life issue.  Secondly, the increased training received 
by those working alongside the artisans may actually increase their chances for 
advancement, as enlisted maintainers advance when they can score high enough on the 
Fleet wide Navy advancement exam for their rate.  Sailors not assigned to a FRC may be 
disadvantaged by not being exposed to the tutelage of the artisans.  Lastly, there stands 
the possibility that a perception may develop regarding a technician’s ability based solely 
on with whom they have worked.     
8. The enlisted force is not alone in dealing with disparity.  When the AIMDs 
are realigned under the FRC, it opens up the possibility that the AIMDs may no longer be 
led by Officers in Charge.  While the final organizational structure of the FRC is not 
complete, given that they will be headed by Commanding Officers at the O6 level, there 
remains a possibility that an OIC’s billet will be redesigned as a Department Head within 
the FRC structure -  a move that may be viewed as tantamount to losing command by 
some.   
                                                 
27 Morgan Gareth, Images of Organization, 2006, Page.28. 
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9. Another major concern is how civilian artisans will be assigned to FRC 
sub-units.  Unless NAVAIR is planning on hiring more artisans, it must be assumed that 
the manning levels at the Depot are going to go down as their labor force is farmed out in 
support of the FRC.  The assumption is that the Depots will experience fewer throughputs 
because of the increased quality and depth of maintenance performed in the Fleet.  Two 
potential problems exist with this thinking.  First, if the anticipated efficiencies are not 
experienced, the Depots may find themselves shorthanded and Fleet turnaround time for 
new inductions may actually increase – counter to the objective of the NAE/FRC.  
Second, with the adoption of the FRP, there stands the possibility that an unusually large 
number of ship, battle group, or air wing deployments could occur at any point.  This 
would leave the FRC sites staffed at dangerously low levels negating any improvement in 
efficiencies.   
 
C. THE FRC AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 
1. Morgan’s use of the metaphor of an organization as a political system is 
centered more on the political tug-of-war between management and labor.  However, he 
also addresses the sources of power within an organization.  Formulation of the FRC 
concept does have the impact of shifting power within Naval Aviation. DoD political 
appointees act in an environment in which they may have a fairly limited amount of 
control over their large, slow to change, bureaucratic organizations.  They mainly set or 
establish policy, but have limited abilities to implement it.  Senior military officers, on 
the other hand, have tremendous power to implement changes through the formal 
authority they have over junior personnel by virtue of law and tradition.  In the case of 
the NAE, there is no evidence to suggest that civilian leadership is involved in setting the 
direction or checking the actions of military leaders.  This doesn’t mean they endorse 
NAE, but they have the power to stop if they didn’t agree with it.  Thus, CNAF has 
basically been given carte blanche to set the strategy and implement it. 
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2. Morgan describes many sources of power.28  
• Formal Authority:  The most basic form of power in the military.  CNAF 
is able to restructure maintenance activities simply because he can by 
virtue of his position.  By shifting the organizations, he gains greater 
visibility and control of activities. 
• Control of Scarce Resources:  Under the previous maintenance schemes, 
much of the resource management was the responsibility of lower echelon 
commanders who were part of command structures that had other 
concerns in addition to maintenance.  With the creation of the FRCs, 
power is shifted up and maintenance resources are managed at higher 
levels.  It is interesting to note that an Admiral billet was created for the 
architect of the FRC construct.  It also creates three additional O6 
command billets that had not previously existed.  This will give the 
designated FRC Commander more control over aviation maintenance than 
any maintenance officer before as he will control the budgeting of funds 
and the selection of his commanders.  
• Use of Organizational Structure, Rules, Regulations, and Procedures:  
“Organizational structure is frequently used as a political instrument.”29   
It can be argued that the formation of the FRC changes very little about 
how maintenance is actually performed.  It does, however, significantly 
change the command structure and the ability of certain leaders to 
influence decisions.  Additionally, the instruction that governed Naval 
Aviation maintenance (OPNAVISNT 4790) which previously fell under 
the purview of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has now been 
changed to the COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790, establishing a significant 
degree of CNAF autonomy.    
• Symbolism and the Management of Meaning:  This relates to the renaming 
of titles within the organization.  The head of CNAF is now the “CEO” 
and his head of NAVAIR is now the “COO”.  Subordinate commands are 
now industry partners.  Senior officials are now considered the Board of 
Directors.  The NAE is shaping, if not coercing, a business mentality 
within Naval aviation by abandoning traditional military terminologies 
and hierarchies and adapting their civilian equivalents.  
 
2. The use and shifting of power within aviation maintenance is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  In shifting to career maintenance officers instead of pilots and 
officers from other career fields, greater influence may be given to maintenance 
operations and top leadership should have greater visibility on maintenance resource 
                                                 
28 Morgan Gareth, Images of Organization, 2006, Page.171. 
29 Morgan Gareth, Images of Organization, 2006, Page.176. 
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issues.  As was stated in the background, there are potential improvements that could be 
seen from this restructure. However, when examining other strategic issues that appear to 
not be addressed, it leads to questioning the motivation behind such bold moves.  
3. The NAE states that its only core stakeholders are the Board of 
Directors.30  The strategy fails to include military and civilian employees, the Navy as a 
whole, Congress, the public, or troops on the ground needing cover from Naval aircraft.  
The NAE appears to be an inward looking strategy even though it says its customers are 
the combatant commanders. 
4. An important aspect that affects the FRC is that the NAE fails to address, 
at least in writing, issues relating to technology of work.  Controlling costs is a major 
thrust of the organization.  Yet, the financial systems are not addressed or emphasized.  
The fact is that without sound, reliable financial information there is no way to know 
what the true cost of work is.  This is made very clear in a statement in one of the more 
recent briefs on the subject, “Cost drivers are decreasing, but costs are increasing.”31  By 
definition, if cost drivers are going down and costs are going up, they have chosen the 
wrong cost drivers.  Military leaders are good at tracking what they spend.  However, 
they are very poor at knowing what activities actually cost.  They are not the same.   
5. One of the main goals of the FRC concept is to reduce Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) expenses and use the savings for recapitalizing aircraft.   
                                                 
30 Naval Aviation Vision 2020, Page 19. 
31 VADM Zortman and VADM Massenburg, “Naval Aviation Enterprise: A Warfighting Partnership”, 




00A1_AirSpeed_Phil_102004_19Oct 04.PPT  33
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
PB96 44 57 79 103 133
PB97 40 56 83 114 124
PB98 51 71 125 144 150 164
PB99 71 119 143 154 164
PB00 105 140 163 183 187 201
PB01 128 130 173 177 187
PB02 88 92 115 119 143 155
PB03 90 85 105 147 193
PB04 93 100 133 191 254 302
# AIRCRAFT
But . . . we cannot afford to buy 
the number of new aircraft we need
• The plan:  buy 201 aircraft in FY05.
• The reality:  we will buy 100 (or fewer) aircraft in FY05.
• The problem:  we need to buy an average of 200 new aircraft 
each year to maintain our average aircraft age.
ACTUAL A/C
 
Figure 12.   Decline in Ability to Recapitalize32 
 
Figure 12 depicts the Department of the Navy’s recent history of aircraft procurement 
plans.  Leadership touts millions in savings so far within the NAE and over $163 million 
in savings last year from reduced flight hours.33  The Navy has not bought one extra 
aircraft in addition to what was previously budgeted.  This is for a couple of reasons.  
First, the budget execution system incentivizes the spending of all money within an 
appropriation.  The AIMDs and depots last year fully spent the money they were 
appropriated.34  Any savings from process improvements went somewhere else within 
the organization.  Second, while CNAF has tremendous powers within the organization, 
power of the purse still remains with Congress.  Any savings in Operations and 
Maintenance funds that are not used can be used wherever Congress sees fit.  There is no 
guaranty that recapitalizing the military is where Congress will ultimately place these 
                                                 
32 NAVAIR AIRspeed overview brief, NAVAIR, October 2004. 
33 VADM Zortman and VADM Massenburg, “Naval Aviation Enterprise: A Warfighting Partnership”, 
brief for the Naval Aviation Enterprise – Investment Alignment Symposium, 8 March 2006. 
34 2007 Navy Budget Submission. 
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funds.  They are under no obligation to buy more planes with savings.  The savings are 
projections of lower future costs that permit the navy to submit a budget request for 
future year that includes less O&MN and more aircraft.  It is not current dollars that can 
be spent on something else.  The NAE has released several statistics which claim 
improvements in maintenance processes like less works in process, shorter cycle times 
and reduction in costs.  However, there is no reference, metric, or number to show that 
these improvements actually increased aircraft ready for tasking.  This leads to the 




III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on principles and practices deemed to be critical to 
successfully changing the culture of an organization.  This chapter will give examples 
from different sources of literature on organizational change.  These sources present a 
number of well established component concepts that are required for change to take hold.  
A summary of each source will be presented as well as a discussion of the potential 
problems tied to the change effort.   
 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
To remain competitive in a dynamic environment, organizations must generally 
undergo some degree of significant change.  Organizational change and development has 
become widespread in communications and educational resources about business, 
organizations, leadership and management.  While examples of successful organizational 
change initiatives are out there, many more companies fail than succeed in their efforts to 
bring about change within their organizations.  There are many different approaches to 
implementing and guiding organizational change.  Some approaches advocate the 
establishment of a “vision” that can help guide an organization from its present state to its 
desired end-state.  There are as many approaches to organizational change as there are 
different personalities of the leaders that will ultimately drive the change – or in some 
cases, fail to drive the change.  However, within academia, there exist many established 
principles that have been tested and validated through empirical studies.  These accepted 
tenets of successful change should be reviewed by any organization contemplating some 
degree of cultural change.  Many of these accepted principles can be applied to the 
NAE’s implementation of FRCs.  However, before we propose to evaluate the current 





1. Kurt Lewin: Force Field Analysis  
One of the pioneers in the field of organizational change and social science was 
Kurt Lewin.   Lewin proposed that there are both driving and restraining forces that effect 
and influence change35.  Lewin went on to develop the Force Field Analysis Model 
depicted in Figure 13, which depicted the interaction of the restraining and driving forces 
and proposed that the desired end state would result in equilibrium.  He identified the 
driving forces as those which affect a situation and push it in a particular direction.  
Driving forces tend act as the impetus for change and tend to keep change moving along.  
He identified restraining forces as those which act to restrain or weaken the driving 
forces.  Equilibrium is said to be achieved when the driving forces equal the restraining 
forces at which point the organization would attempt to “freeze” their current state. 
Lewin contended that to make change happen, an organization must first 
“unfreeze” from its current state and move toward its desired end-state as expressed by 
some form of “vision”.  As depicted in Lewin’s model, the driving forces must be 
stronger than the restraining forces in order for change to take place.  This battle between 
forces will continue until a new equilibrium is reached.  The challenge for management is 
to ensure that their organizational environment does not reach equilibrium and refreeze 
until their desired change objectives have been reached.   
Lewin suggests three steps to move toward equilibrium.  First, communicating 
between the two forces where the equilibrium is now and where it is desired to be.  
Second, plan for transitioning with both forces participating toward the future vision.  
Lastly, Lewin suggests refreezing when the desired outcome has been attained and the 
forces are in equilibrium.   
 
                                                 
35 Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science, 1951, Page 47.  
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Figure 13.   Lewin’s Force Field Analysis Model36 
 
2. John Cresie: Changing the Culture of your Organization 
Cresie authored an interesting article in Law and Order, a professional law 
enforcement journal, where he presented a model of change for organizations structurally 
similar to the military.  Cresie established a four step process for making significant 
progress toward changing the culture or “personality” of an organization.  He recognized 
the magnitude of commitment required by an organization endeavoring to change its 
culture and further stated that such an undertaking must be embarked upon first by 
accepting not only that change takes time, but that a long term commitment will be 
required to complete the process.37  Cresie estimated that a change effort could typically 
take five to seven years before the culture of an organization is effectively changed.38  
Similar to Lewin’s approach, Cresie acknowledged that people have a natural resistance 
to change, happy to remain in their comfort zone.  He proposed that in order to begin to 
change the culture, leaders must establish a new value system for the organization and its 
employees.39  To accomplish this, Cresie suggested the following four steps: 
                                                 
36 http://www.accel-team.com/techniques/force_field_analysis.html: 2006 Accel-Team   
37 John Cresie, Changing the Culture of Your Organization, Law and Order, 53, 12, December 2005, 
Page 75. 
38 John Cresie, Changing the Culture of Your Organization, Law and Order, 53, 12, December 2005, 
Page 75. 
39 John Cresie, Changing the Culture of Your Organization, Law and Order, 53, 12, December 2005, 
Page 75. 
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a. Develop a Vision for the Future 
The chiefs and the leaders must develop a vision for the future that can be 
understood and adopted by the employees.  Once the vision is accepted and a direction is 
set the employees must be empowered to achieve the vision.  If the employees are 
empowered it gives a sense of ownership and they will work toward implementing the 
idea.  
b. Develop a Written Mission Statement 
A written mission statement must be created.  Ideally this should be done 
by the different departments within the organization working together to help clarify the 
organization’s mission.  This tends to be seen as an empowering activity which connects 
the employees with the change effort.40  Once the mission statement is developed the 
leaders must communicate the mission statement to all.   
c. Develop a Set of Core Values 
The chief must determine what core values he personally holds as 
important for his organization’s culture.  Once they are established the chief must 
communicate these core values and embody them through personal example.  The chief 
must then encourage his people to adopt those same values.   
d. Examine Established Work Processes 
The chief and leaders must be part of the communication process and a 
way to do this is by clarifying performance expectations and setting organizational 
standards.41  Performance evaluations communicate expectations and provide a measure 
of employee commitment and performance.  They can also be used to place 
accountability for employees’ individual efforts in regards to change.   
Cresie’s four steps provide a clear model for engineering successful 
cultural change within an organizational.   
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Page 77. 
41 John Cresie, Changing the Culture of Your Organization, Law and Order, 53, 12, December 2005, 
Page 77. 
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3. John Kotter 
Kotter established the Eight Step Model,42 considered one of the more well-
known and applied change models, and supplemented it with other concepts in support of 
the model.   
a. Kotter’s Eight Steps Consist of 
Establish a Sense of Urgency.  Kotter describes the biggest mistake people 
make when trying to change organizations is to plunge ahead without establishing a high 
enough sense of urgency in fellow managers and employees.  Kotter believes this error is 
fatal because transformations always fail to achieve their objectives when complacency 
levels are high.43  Kotter recommends identifying crises, potential crises and other major 
opportunities to establish a sense of urgency. 
Create the Guiding Coalition.  Kotter stresses building coalitions with key 
members.  The coalition needs key members that are committed and can make 
organizational change occur.  To ensure this, Kotter identifies four characteristics 
essential for creating effective coalitions44: 
• Position power:  Must have enough key players throughout the 
organization to push through the change. 
• Expertise:  Must have enough relevant experience to make informed and 
intelligent decisions. 
• Credibility:  Must have a coalition staffed by members with good 
reputations. 
• Leadership:  Must have sufficient and proven leaders to drive the change 
process. 
Developing a Vision and Strategy.  Kotter stated that a vision “refers to a 
picture of the future with some implicit or explicit commentary on why people should 
                                                 
42 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Excerpt, Chapter 1, 1996, Page 1. 
43 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Excerpt, Chapter 1, 1996, Page 1. 
44 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Excerpt, Chapter 1, 1996, Page 1. 
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strive to create that future.”45  Kotter identified several characteristics of an effective 
vision:46  
• Imaginable: Conveys a picture of what the future will look like. 
• Desirable: Appeals to the long-term interests of employees, customers, 
stockholders, and others who have a stake in the enterprise. 
• Feasible: Comprises realistic, attainable goals. 
• Focused: Is clear enough to provide guidance in decision making. 
• Flexible: Is general enough to allow individual initiative and alternative 
responses in light of changing conditions. 
• Communicable: Is easy to communicate; can be successfully explained 
within 5 minutes. 
Communicating the Vision.  Kotter rationalizes that the power of a vision is 
unleashed only when the majority of the enterprise has a common understanding of its 
goals and direction.47   As such, the enterprise must use every communication vehicle in 
its power to help communicate the vision.  Kotter lists several key elements to help 
effectively communicate the vision:48 
• Simplicity:  all jargon and techno babble must be eliminated. 
• Use metaphor, analogy, and example: a verbal picture is worth a thousand 
words. 
• Multiple forums: big meetings and small, memos and newspaper, formal 
and informal interaction—all are effective for spreading the word. 
• Repetition:  ideas sink in deeply only after they have been heard many 
times. 
• Leadership by example: behavior from important people that is 
inconsistent with the vision overwhelms other forms of communication. 
• Explanation of seeming inconsistencies: unaddressed inconsistencies 
undermine the credibility of all communication. 
• Give-and-take: two-way communication is always more powerful than 
one-way communication. 
                                                 
45 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Excerpt, Chapter 1, 1996, Page 1. 
46 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Excerpt, Chapter 1, 1996, Page 1. 
47 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Excerpt, Chapter 1, 1996, Page 1. 
48 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Excerpt, Chapter 1, 1996, Page 1. 
 37
Empower Broad-Based Action.  Kotter recommends empowering broad-based 
action by eliminating any obstacles and systems of structures that undermine the vision.  
These must be changed or eliminated.  Finally, risk taking and non-traditional ideas, 
activities and actions must be encouraged.49 
Generating Short-Term Wins.  Kotter states that in order to generate and sustain 
momentum through the change process, visible improvements or “wins” are needed to 
engage the workforce.50  In a lengthy change process, motivation may falter resulting in 
decreased momentum toward the desired end-state.  Therefore, short-term wins must be 
constructed to show and celebrate gradual improvement.  These ceremonies must be 
visible so as to recognize and reward the individuals and teams that enabled the 
improvement.51 
Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change.  As the wins increase, thus 
adding to the credibility of the organizational change, these gains must be consolidated to 
change any remaining systems, structures and policies that do not fit the vision.  Efforts 
need to be increased to hire, promote and continue to develop the employees who are able 
to implement the vision.  Successful momentum can help reinvigorate the change process 
with additional projects.52 
Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture.  Once the desired end-state is 
achieved, management must clearly articulate the connections between the new behaviors 
and the resulting organizational success.  For example, the new customer and/or 
productivity oriented behavior, more effective leadership and management resulting in 
better performance must be identified and communicated to ensure sustained success.53  
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b. Kotter on Leadership 
Kotter stated that “leadership drives the complex change process found in 
firms that excel in the new economy”.54  He further described leadership as the “engine” 
that drives change. Leadership sets the direction and vision for change and keeps it going 
in the right direction.  Leadership motivates people to make the vision happen even if 
there are setbacks.  Kotter explained that great managers are not enough, because you 
can’t manage change you must lead through change55.  The leadership engine allows for 
small wins and uses momentum to drive through change.  Kotter sees four traits of good 
leaders:56 
• Drive and Energy Level - inner drive reduces difficulties and produces 
change and encourages others with the incentive to lead.  
• Intelligence - eases the difficulties in change and sets the right direction 
for a simpler and more acceptable change.  
• Mental and Emotional Health - develops interpersonal skills for clear and 
focused visions of change. 
• Integrity - people won’t follow individuals whom they believe lack 
integrity.    
Good leaders use inclusive visions, articulated with passion, that draw on 
core values.  Good Leaders also draw out the best in people and fuse energy in pursuit of 
positive, useful goals.57  All four traits create trust and commitment for the leadership 
that is needed for successful cultural change for organizational change.   
c. Kotter on Transforming Organizations 
Kotter believes many organizations fail to change because they make 
common errors that trained leaders should avoid. 58   
• Allowing too much complacency 
• Failing to create a guiding coalition 
• Underselling the power of vision  
                                                 
54 John Kotter, Leadership Engine, Executive Excellence, April 2000, Page 7.   
55 John Kotter, Leadership Engine, Executive Excellence, April 2000, Page 7. 
56 John Kotter, Leadership Engine, Executive Excellence, April 2000, Page 7. 
57 John Kotter, Leadership Engine, Executive Excellence, April 2000, Page 7. 
58 John Kotter, Transforming Organizations, Executive Excellence, September 1996, Page 13. 
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• Underselling the vision itself 
• Permitting obstacles to block the vision 
• Failing to create short-term wins 
• Declaring victory to soon 
• Neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate culture 
Failures in the change process can be avoided if efforts are aligned with 
Kotter’s eight step model noted earlier.  If leaders are trained to avoid these mistakes it 
will make transforming organizations smoother.  Transforming an organization takes 
training at all levels.   
 
4. Jeanie Daniel Duck 
When change is directed and happens in a work space it requires employees to 
think, feel, and do things differently.   Duck contends that people deal with change in 
their own unique ways and that attention must be paid to managing emotions that are 
usually not encountered in the workplace.   Duck stated that two important ingredients 
are required for change; trust and empowerment59.  Leaders must balance trust and 
empowerment for transition and managing change.   Trust is built through predictability 
and capability.  Empowerment is inviting to employees and gives them a chance to co-
create the company’s future.  Duck stressed eight responsibilities for leadership to 
effectively implement change.60 
• Establish context for change and provide guidance 
• Stimulate conversation in the organization 
• Provide appropriate resources for change 
• Coordinate and align projects for a coherent plan 
• Ensure congruence of messaging, activities, policies and behaviors 
• Provide opportunity for joint creation. 
                                                 
59 Duck, Jeanie Daniel, Managing Change: The Art of Balancing, Harvard Business Review, 
November-December 1993, Page113.   
60 Jeanie Daniel Duck, Managing Change: The Art of Balancing, Harvard Business Review, 
November-December 1993, Page 117. 
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• Anticipate, identify, and address people problems 
• Prepare the critical mass   
 
In times of change, the contribution of leadership is checking the dynamics of the 
most important piece, the employees and their emotions.  The balancing of the employee 
trust and employee empowerment is pivotal and vital for change.   
 
5. Reward Practices  
Many organizations apply a variety of rewards to attract, motivate, and retain 
employees.61 Rewards and incentives have a major impact on organizational change 
behavior and provide a reason for employees to go along with change and enforce and 
reinforce new changes.   There are four types of rewards/incentives which have their 
advantages and disadvantages.62  
• Membership/seniority – rewards could be pay, benefits and paid time off   
• Advantages – attract applicants, minimize stress if insecurity, and reduced 
turnover. 
• Disadvantages – doesn’t motivate performance, poor performers 
discouraged from leaving, set pay may undermine performance. 
• Job Status – rewards could be promotion based pay scale, and status based 
benefits  
• Advantages – tries to maintain internal equity, minimizes pay 
discrimination, and motivates employees to compete for promotions. 
• Disadvantages – encourages political tactics to increase job worth, creates 
psychological distance between employees and executives. 
• Competencies - rewards could be pay increase based on competency, or 
skill-based pay 
• Advantages – improves workforce flexibility, tends to improve quality, 
and is consistent with employability 
                                                 
61 Steven McShane & Mary Ann Von Glindo, Organizational Behavior 3e,  McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2005, 
Page 176. 
62 Steven McShane & Mary Ann Von Glindo, Organizational Behavior 3e,  McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2005, 
Page 177. 
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• Disadvantages – subjective measurement of competencies, and skill-based 
plans are expensive. 
• Task performance – rewards could be commissions, merit pay, gain 
sharing, profit sharing, or stock options 
• Advantages – motivates task performance, attracts performance oriented 
applicants, organizational rewards create ownership culture, and pay 
variability may avoid layoffs during downturns 
• Disadvantages  - may weaken motivation for job itself, may distance 
reward giver from receiver, or can viewed as quick fixes, but don’t solve 
real causes  
Almost all organizations reward their employees to some extent based on the level 
or the status of their position in the organization.  Most employees are given an 
evaluation to ensure the employee is being communicated to on what their job description 
is.  This also gives feedback to see they are meeting the expectations of that job.  If 
expectations are met it usually improves chances on getting promotions, incentive, or 
rewards.   
6. Psychological Contracts 
The psychological contract is represented by individual beliefs shaped by an 
organization, regarding terms of exchange between individuals and their organization.63    
Naval Aviation maintenance personnel have beliefs that are based on promises made, 
accepted, and relied on with and by their senior leadership.  These individual contracts tie 
the individual first to levels of leadership in maintenance management and also to the 
overall organization of Naval aviation maintenance.  The psychological contract provides 
commitment and understandable and predictable actions to both the individual and others 
toward the end state goals. 
A key feature of the psychological contract is that the individual voluntarily 
consents to make and accept certain promises as he or she understands them.64  A 
drawback may happen when two different views of the organization could be held by two 
people.  While two different viewpoints may appear to share the same organizational 
goal, in reality their goals may be quite different based on personal perception.  
                                                 
63 Rousseau Denise, Psychological Contracts in Organizations, 1995, Page 9. 
64 Rousseau Denise, Psychological Contracts in Organizations, 1995, Page 10. 
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Organizations that have a culture based on history should make sure that they pay 
attention to employees’ expectations.  Reciprocity with employees should come from the 
highest levels of the organization to ensure the individual psychological contract is 
beneficial to all parties. 
   
C. SUMMARY  
This chapter identified and briefly discussed several organizational change 
models, theories, and concepts that are believed to be essential when trying to implement 
organizational change.  Although the different authors present different views and 
approaches in describing their beliefs on organizational change, they do share five 
common features.  Communication, commitment, trust/social support, empowerment, and 






IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This MBA project evaluates the NAE’s approach to change management.  The 
principal methodology for the study consisted of a review of academic literature 
combined with the administration of an online survey, site visits and informal interviews.  
A model for change is presented in paragraph G of this chapter.  A discussion of model 
validation is presented in Chapter V (Analysis).   
 
B. SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
Research for the Project was conducted at six primary locations; Fleet Readiness 
Center South West (to include the organizations formerly identified as AIMD North 
Island and NADEP North Island), AIMD Point Mugu, MALS 11, MALS 16, and MALS 
39.  The chosen sites represent a cross section of organizations spanning all three levels 
of aviation maintenance - Organizational, Intermediate and Depot.  Additionally, these 
sites allowed for comparison of perceptions among Navy, Marine Corp and civil service 
personnel.  We set no limits on the number of participants, and an online survey was 
made available to all personnel.  From a total population of approximately 1600 people 
who were invited to complete the voluntary survey, a total of 247 personnel responded.   
 
A complete analysis of respondent demographics is available in Appendix A.  As 
noted below in Figure 14, only two respondents out of 247 declined the survey.   
1.  I agree to participate in the survey
245 99.2 99.2 99.2










Figure 14.   Voluntary Participation 
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The sample was heavily biased by Intermediate level maintenance personnel who 
represented 92.6 percent of the total respondents.  While Navy Intermediate level 
maintenance personnel were assigned duties classified as “shore”, the Marine Corps 
respondents who composed 55.6 percent of the total respondents were all considered 
deployable personnel.  The survey underrepresented civil service employees, who only 
composed 1.2 percent of total respondents.   
2.  Please indicate your branch of service
135 54.7 55.6 55.6
105 42.5 43.2 98.8















Figure 15.   Respondent Composition 
 
The survey was administered to active duty personnel in the pay grades E1-O10 
and also made available to Civil Service respondents in the WG and GS pay scales.  The 
distribution of respondent pay grades is noted in Figure 16. 
3.  Please indicate your current rank/rate/paygrade
71 28.7 29.2 29.2
50 20.2 20.6 49.8
38 15.4 15.6 65.4
21 8.5 8.6 74.1
17 6.9 7.0 81.1
13 5.3 5.3 86.4
9 3.6 3.7 90.1
4 1.6 1.6 91.8
4 1.6 1.6 93.4
3 1.2 1.2 94.7
3 1.2 1.2 95.9
2 .8 .8 96.7
2 .8 .8 97.5
2 .8 .8 98.4
1 .4 .4 98.8
1 .4 .4 99.2
1 .4 .4 99.6






























Figure 16.   Respondent Pay grade Distribution 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RATIONALE 
Field research was conducted primarily through site visits and the administration 
of an online survey.  The survey was designed to measure key elements determined to be 
relevant predictors of an organization’s potential to foster positive change.  
Determination of key variables was made through an extensive literature review of both 
academic journals and case studies of successful organizational change endeavors in the 
corporate arena.  The research study was designed to subjectively and quantitatively 
evaluate the change climate present throughout units affected by the FRC 
implementation.  Informal interviews were conducted with a diverse cross section of 
personnel while executing the site visits and an IRB approved survey was developed and 
made available to all six activities.   
The survey methodology involved administering an online survey to both military 
and civilian personnel encompassing the ranks/pay-grades/positions of E1-O6, and WG4-
GS13.  An instruction sheet accompanied each survey and the respondents were given the 
choice to either consent to or decline participation.  The surveys were self-administered 
after acceptance and consent by the respondent.  The survey was designed to capture each 
respondent’s perception of how well change was being managed as their respective 
organizations progressed towards transforming their structures and practices to conform 
to the new model dictated by the implementation of FRCs.   
General biographic data about the respondents to include branch of service, pay 
grade, rank, type of duty assignment, total years of service, and general work assignment 
were collected.  All respondents remained anonymous and no attempt was made to 
identify individual respondents. 
 
D. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT 
The preponderance of the survey questions were designed for a single response 
based on a five point Likert scale.  The survey concluded with a single open-ended essay 
question which allowed for respondents to provide any inputs they felt to be germane to 
the study.  A link to the on-line survey was distributed to a single designated 
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representative at each of the participating units identified in part B of the Research 
Methodology section.  Designated representatives then emailed the survey link to their 
unit’s entire population as defined by their local area network distribution lists.  
Prospective respondents were provided with a brief summary of the survey’s purpose and 
invited to voluntarily participate.  Prospective respondents declining to participate in the 
survey were immediately directed to a survey exit screen.  All survey responses were 
collected online and no hard copy surveys were distributed.   
 
E. FACTOR ANALYSIS AND SCALE CONSTRUCTION 
Survey output was generated by Surveymonkey.com, the host site of the survey.  
Output was in the form of a .csv file that was converted into Microsoft Excel file.  From 
there, the data were imported into SPSS 15.0 for Windows Evaluation Version, Release 
15.0.0 (6 September 2006).  Initial factor analysis was conducted using principle 
component analysis with varimax rotation.  Items with component loadings below .5 
were dropped, and the remaining components were reanalyzed.  Resulting factors were 
tested for scale reliability, and a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of at least .7 was required 
for inclusion in subsequent tests.  Components that attained satisfactory reliability scores 
were then converted into scale scores by averaging.  
   
F. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
The survey was developed after concluding the literature review.  Initially, five 
major aspects of change were targeted for the research.  Those aspects were:   
• Award Systems (10 questions) 
• Communication (14 questions) 
• Commitment (11 questions) 
• Empowerment (11 questions) 
• Trust (12 questions) 
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After analyzing the data, we found that the items loaded into prominent factors 
that differed somewhat from our expectations.  As a result, a revised change model was 
developed.  The newly identified factors were: 
 
1. Urgency   
The survey asked seven questions related to sense of urgency.  After completing a 
factor analysis in SPSS, reliability testing yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .760.  All survey 
questions are included as Appendix X.  Specific questions related to urgency numbered; 
29, 32, 46, 48, 49, 50, and 59.    Urgency was utilized as a predictor variable on the 
organizational change test model.  The intent behind the use of this predictor was to 
determine if within the surveyed organizations, there existed a sense of pressing 
importance requiring action on the part of the workforce.  For the purpose of this study, 
questions regarding the implementation of AIRspeed were interpreted as indicators of the 
organizations’ sense of urgency.  For example, question number 48 ”If I don’t apply the 
tenets of AIRspeed to my daily work I will never get promoted”, was intended to discern 
whether or not the organization had created stakes that would drive their personnel to 
support the change.      
 
  2. Incentives Tied to Change 
The survey asked three questions related to incentives tied to change.  These 
loaded on one factor and demonstrated adequate reliability as a scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.764).  Question relating to incentives tied to change numbered 31, 27, and 28.  Incentives 
tied to change were deemed to be an input into the change process.  Questions related to 
incentives tied to change were designed to determine whether or not incentives, both 
positive and negative, have been utilized by the studied organizations in an attempt to 
modify behavior of personnel.   
 
3. Organizational Commitment to Change 
The survey asked two questions related to the organization’s commitment to 
change.  After validating this through factor analysis, reliability testing indicated an 
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acceptable Cronbach’s alpha of .718 for the scale.  Specific questions related to 
organizational commitment to change numbered 57 and 58.  Organizational commitment 
to change was utilized as dependent variable in the organizational change test model.   
Questions related to an organization’s commitment to change were designed to determine 
the extent to which the studied organizations have modified practices or committed 
resources in support of the change process. 
 
4. Attitude 
The survey asked eight questions related to employee attitude.  A factor analysis 
was conducted in SPSS encompassing questions 41, 43, 44, 65, 66, 68, 75, and 79.  All of 
these items loaded on one factor.  A reliability analysis was then conducted on the same 
questions yielding a Cronbach’s alpha of .734.  Attitude was utilized as a dependent 
variable in the organizational change test model.  Questions related to attitude were 
designed to interpret general indicators of employee satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the work environment as the organizations go through the change process.  It is important 
to note that this survey’s questions regarding attitude were phrased negatively; for 
example, question number 79 stated “my command shows very little concern for my 
well-being”.  Responses were based on a 5 point Likert scale where Strongly Agree 
equated to a score of 1, Agree equated to 2, Don’t Know equated to 3, Disagree equated 
to 4 and Strongly Disagree equated to 5.  A listing of all survey questions and responses 
is available in Appendix A. 
 
5. Information  
The survey asked five questions related to access to and receipt of information 
regarding the change effort.  Questions regarding information focused on whether or not 
personnel had received information that explained the impact of the FRC integration on 
their jobs.  Additional questions in this category asked if they had received training or 
had access to training that would prepare them professionally for their new roles within 
the FRCs.  After completing a factor analysis in SPSS, it was determined that the 
category of information contained one valid component which was identified by 
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questions 10, 11, 12, 13, and 39.  Reliability analysis yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .825.  
The component information was utilized as a dependent variable in the organizational 
change test model.   
 
6. Communication  
The survey asked two questions related to communication.  The intent of the 
questions was to discover the extent to which workers had been exposed to informal 
communications regarding the change.  Specifically, the questions were designed to 
determine if the respondents had been exposed to rumors or other informal information 
about the potential benefits and risks of changing from three levels of maintenance to 
two, and the overall concept of implementing FRCs.  After completing a factor analysis 
in SPSS, it was determined that the category of communication contained one valid 
component which was identified by questions 16 and 18.  Reliability analysis yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .850.  Communication was used as predictor variable in the 
organizational change test model.     
 
7. Leadership Support of Airspeed 
The survey asked seven questions related to leadership support of Airspeed.  
After completing a factor analysis in SPSS, further reliability testing inducted a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .871 for this factor.  Questions related to leadership support of 
AIRspeed numbered 37, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56.    Leadership support of AIRspeed was 
used as a predictor variable in the organizational change test model.  Questions related to 
this variable were designed to determine the degree to which personnel perceived that 
their leaders supported organizational change in a meaningful way. 
 
8. Perception 
The concept of perception was represented by question number 30 which stated, 
“I believe AIRspeed is having a”.  The question was posed on a four point Likert scale 
where the response “a large positive impact on readiness” represented a value of one, “a 
moderate positive impact on readiness” represented a value of two, “no impact on 
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readiness” represented a value of three, and “a negative impact on readiness” represented 
a value of four.   Perception was utilized as a dependent variable in the organizational 
change test model. 
 
9. Leadership Visibility 
The survey asked three questions related to leadership visibility.  A factor analysis 
was conducted in SPSS encompassing questions 17, 19 and 20.  These items loaded on 
one factor.  A reliability analysis was then conducted on the same questions yielding a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .682.  While the alpha was considered just below the threshold 
standard (.7), its potential impact should not be ignored.  Leadership visibility was used 
neither as a predictor variable nor a dependent variable in the organizational change test 
model.  It is being presented here simply to note that further research into its relationship 
in an organizational change model may be merited.   
 
G. INITIAL MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
 The academic literature review was used to construct a theoretical model of key 
elements critical to the success of a change management effort.  Discussion of the 
conclusions reached in validating this model will be presented in chapter V (Analysis).  
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Figure 17.   Organizational Change Model 
 
H. INFORMAL INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS 
General observations are presented in Chapter VI.  Informal interviews were 
conducted with personnel in the pay grades of E3 through O5 while executing the site 
visits.  The venue consisted of asking general questions related to the change, while the 
individuals were performing tasks in their assigned workspace.  Additionally, two civil 
















The literature review conducted in Chapter III led to the design of a survey that 
initially targeted five key components of change, specifically; award systems, 
commitment, communication, empowerment, and trust.     
 The intention of the research was to identify which factors were indeed more 
critical to the change effort and to then use those validated findings to create a real world 
model that, at a minimum, applied to the unique cultures being integrated through the 
implementation of FRCs.  While the five key factors which the first model was structured 
around did prove relevant to the change effort, the validated model presented in this 
chapter serves to better explain the relationships among factors within the context of 
FRCs.  What follows is a discussion of the findings.    
 
B. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Correlations   
The correlation matrix depicted in Figure 18, shows relationships among tested 




Correlations considered significant at p < .05 appear in bold italic print. 
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2. Mean and Standard Deviation Information 
 
Mean   Standard Deviation  N 
Attitude 3.10 0.66 213 
Information 2.37 0.85 235 
Organization's 
Commitment to 
Change 3.24 1.23 213 
Urgency 3.09 0.76 226 
Incentives Tied to 
Change 2.94 1.07 227 
Communication 2.69 1.03 227 
Leadership Support 
of AIRspeed 2.51 0.87 213 
Navy 0.43 0.50 243 
Marine Corps 0.56 0.50 243 
Civilian 6.82 3.56 247 
20+ Years of service 0.13 0.34 247 
Know Mission 
Statement 
(Question # 9) 2.18 1.08 235 
Perception 
(Question # 30) 2.27 0.91 226 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
3. Discussion of Organizational Commitment Regression Test Model 
The control model that was used in each regression analysis presented in this 
section was constructed with five components.  First, the variable pay grade was chosen 
to see if responses would vary significantly between pay grades.  Because there were a 
few people for whom pay grade information was missing, the mean score of all responses 
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for pay grade was used so that the lack of responses would not remove their data from 
the regression models.  Next, know mission statement (Question #9) was chosen to 
determine if there was a significant impact on the model between people that knew their 
unit’s mission statement and those that did not.  The indicator variables Marine Corps 
and Civilian were included to determine if there were significant differences in 
perceptions between branches of service.  The last control variable, shown as 20+ Years 
of Service, represented personnel with twenty or more years of service in an effort to 
determine if seniority would affect the outcome.   
Predictor variables in the organizational change test model included leadership 
support of AIRspeed, communication, incentives tied to change, and urgency.  These 
variables were chosen as predictors due to their perceived likelihood of having an impact 
on the organizational change test model based on results of academic literature review.  
Scale scores were created for all predictor variables.  See Methodology section F for 
details on predictor variable construction.  Dependent variables included organizational 
commitment to change, perception (as indicated by question #30), information, and 
attitude.   
The control model explained 10.4 percent of the variance in perceived 
organizational commitment to the change with less than p < .001 chance of error, while 
the addition of the predictor variables increased the explanatory power of the model 
which now accounted for 40.2 percent of the variance at the same level of significance.  It 
was noted that in the control group, the Marine Corps’ unstandardized (B) coefficient of 
.587 represents a more negative perception of the desired outcome (change) than is held 
by members of the Navy.  The other notable event in the control model involved the 
group with 20+ Years of Service.  This group’s B score of -.533 indicates that employees 
with 20 or more years of service perceive an alignment of the organization’s commitment 
to the goal of change.  It should be noted that this score was attained at a lower 
significance level of .058.  Interestingly, this is also the group that would be most 
responsible for supporting the organization’s change goals.     
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Predictor Variables
(Inputs to the change process)
Dependent Variable























R2 Change = .298 
p < .001
A subcomponent of 
successful change
 
Figure 19.   Organizational Commitment to Change Regression  Test Model65 
 
The predictor incentives tied to change was not significant in analyzing the 
respondents’ perception of their organization’s commitment to change.  However, three 
other predictors did show significant relationships.  First, leadership support of AIRspeed 
indicated the highest beta in the group, along with B = .624, p < .001).  This indicates that 
the level of perceived leadership support of AIRspeed was directly linked to the 
perceived level of organizational commitment to change.  The next significant predictor 
was urgency (B = .374, p < .001), followed by communication (B = .129, p = .087).  No 
issues were noted with collinearity.  
 
                                                 




Variable Control Modela Complete Modela 
Pay grade -.013 -.017 
Know Mission Statement 
(Question #9) 
.138† .009 
Marine Corps .587*** .189 
20+ Years in Service  -.533† -.268 
Civilian -.109 -.460 
Leadership Support of 
AIRspeed 
 .624*** 
Communication  .129† 
Incentives Tied to Change  -.033 
Urgency  .374*** 
R2 Model .104*** .402*** 
F Statistic for R2 





R2 Change  .298*** 
F Statistic for R2 Change 




Regression models predicting perceived organizational commitment to change effort.  † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported.  Likert scale used in question as follows: 1=strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Don’t 
Know, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree. 
 
Table 2. Organizational Commitment to Change Regression Model 
 
4. Discussion of Perception Regression Test Model 
The Perception regression looked at the employees’ assessments of AIRspeed’s 
impact, both positive and negative, on the unit’s mission.  The control model in this 
regression explained 6.8 percent of the variance in the dependent variable with less than p 
< .05 chance of error, while rerunning the model with the predictor variables inserted 
explained a more powerful 33.1 percent of the variance at the p < .001 level of 
significance.  In the control group, the Marine Corps (B = .309, p = .015) indicated that 
AIRspeed was having a less positive impact on their unit’s mission.  It’s interesting to 
note here that the correlation table in Table 3 indicates that the Marine Corps shows a 
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Figure 20.   Perception Regression Test Model66 
 
Additionally, in the control model, knowledge of the mission was shown to have a 
positive relationship with the perception that AIRspeed was having a positive impact on a 
member’s unit (B = .132, p = .030).  The implication is that the Marine Corps knows the 
mission, but is not convinced that AIRspeed is amenable to accomplishing that mission.  













                                                 





Variable Control Modelb Complete Modelb 
Pay grade -.030 -.015 
Know Mission Statement 
(Question #9) 
.132* .075 
Marine Corps .309* .157 
20+ years in service  -.036 .075 
Civilian .632 -.026 
Leadership Support of 
AIRspeed 
 .345*** 
Communication  .016 
Incentives Tied to Change  .212*** 
Urgency  -.528*** 
R2 Model .068** .331*** 
F Statistic for R2 





R2 Change  .253*** 
F Statistic for R2 Change 





Regression models predicting impact of perception on change effort.  † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. 
Table 3. Perception Regression Model 
 
The predictors leadership support of AIRspeed (B = .345, p = .001), incentives 
tied to change (B = .212, p = .001), and urgency (B = -.528, p = .001) all significantly 
impacted the model.  Overall, the less favorable assessment by Marines was mediated by 
leadership support of AIRspeed, incentives and urgency.  A conceptual model of their 









Barriers to acceptance of AIRspeed
  




Figure eight illustrates the following conclusions gleaned from the Perception 
Regression: 
 
• Knowing the mission statement has a positive effect on the perception of 
AIRspeed’s effectiveness.  The Marine Corps has a negative correlation 
with the perception of AIRspeed’s effectiveness. 
• The Marine Corps perceives lower values for leadership support of 
AIRspeed, incentives, and urgency.  This is having a negative impact on 
their perception of AIRspeed’s effectiveness. 
• Incentives are not well aligned with support of AIRspeed by Marine Corps 
personnel.   
• Urgency is highly correlated with the perception that AIRspeed is having a 
positive impact on readiness. 
Further discussion and recommendations will be addressed in Chapter VI Conclusions. 
 
5. Discussion of Information Regression 
The Information Regression Model looked at the degree to which respondents had 
received information related to the impact that FRC integration may have on their jobs 
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and whether or not they had received training or had access to training that would prepare 
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Figure 22.   Information Regression Test Model67 
 
The control model explained 20.7 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable with p < .001 chance of error, while the predictor model explained 52.2 percent 
of the variance at the p < .001 level of significance.  Of all four regressions presented, 
this model showed the strongest relationships between the predictor variables and the 
dependent variable.  Of note in the control group, know mission statement (B = .332, p < 
.001) was a strong indicator of how effectively information was absorbed.  The Marine 
Corps indicator variable (B = .424, p < .001) indicated that information was highly 
correlated with the Marine Corps, such that Marines reported less information that 
supports the change.  The non-significant coefficient for the variable Marine Corps in the 
Information Model indicates that this effect is mediated by the Marine Corps’ 
perceptions of leadership support, inclusion in informal communications, and incentives.     
                                                 





Variable Control Modelc Complete Modelc 
Pay grade .017 .018 
Know Mission Statement 
(Question #9) 
.332*** .228*** 
Marine Corps .424*** .117 
20+ Years in Service  -.131 .091 
Civilian .270 .029 
Leadership Support of 
AIRSpeed 
 .255*** 
Communication  .238*** 
Incentives Tied to Change  .175*** 
Urgency  -.040 
R2 Model .207*** .522*** 
F Statistic for R2 





R2 Change  .315*** 
F Statistic for R2 Change 





Regression models predicting perceived impact of information on change effort.  p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. 
Table 4. Information Regression Model 
 
The four predictor variables in the Information Regression Test Model had a 
significant impact on the dependent variable - information.  The following predictors 
were significant; leadership support of change (B = .255, p < .001), incentives tied to 
change (B = .175, p < .001), communication (B = .238, p < .001), and know mission 
statement (Question #9) (B = .228, p < .041).   
 
6. Discussion of Attitude Regression Model 
The Attitude Regression Test Model looked at the degree to which predictor 
variables impacted attitude, a critical component in organizational change.     
The control model explained only four percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable (p = .127), while the Attitude Regression Test Model explained 29.4 percent of 
the variance (p < .001), after the insertion of the predictor variables.  As illustrated in 
Table 5, communication and incentives tied to change had no significance in the model.  
 64
However, leadership support of AIRspeed and urgency both maintained significance in 
the model as they have in all previous regressions presented.  In this case, both leadership 
support of AIRspeed and urgency were positively correlated with attitude, indicating that 





















R2 Change = .253
p < .001
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successful change
Predictor Variables
(Inputs to the change process)
Dependent Variable
(Outcome predicted by regression)
 
 












                                                 




Variable Control Modeld Complete Modeld 
Pay grade .028† .013 
Know Mission Statement 
(Question #9) 
-.040 -.073† 
Marine Corps .091 -.027 
20+ Years in Service  -.075 .012 
Civilian -.323 -.197 
Leadership Support of 
AIRspeed 
 .123* 
Communication  -.043 
Incentives Tied to Change  -.051 
Urgency  .438*** 
R2 Model .040 .294*** 
F Statistic for R2 





R2 Change  .253*** 
F Statistic for R2 Change 





Regression models predicting perceived impact of attitude on change effort.  p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. 
Table 5. Attitude Regression Model 
 
Only three predictor variables showed any degree of significance.  First, urgency 
(B = .438, p < .001) had an extremely high Beta of .498.  Next, leadership support of 
AIRspeed (B = .123, p < .05), and know mission statement (Question #9) (B =  
























This chapter will discuss the implication of the analysis on the current FRC 
integration effort and will offer suggestions on how to improve areas that were identified 
through regression analysis.   
 
REGRESSION MODEL IMPLICATION TO FLEET READINESS    CENTERS 
  Of the four models presented, the Information Regression Test Model proved to 
have the highest explanatory power.  While it shared the common predictor variables 
leadership support of AIRspeed, communication, incentives tied to change, and urgency, 
with the other models tested, it was discovered that commonality of impact existed 
between two of the variables.  For example, leadership support of AIRspeed had the 
greatest amount of impact on both the Organizational Commitment to Change Regression 
Test Model and the Information Regression Test Model.     
Predictor Variables
(Inputs to the change process)
Dependent Variable























R2 Change = .298 
p < .001
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Figure 24.   Comparison of Organizational Commitment to Change Test Model and 
Information Regression Test Model69 
 
 
Likewise, the predictor variable urgency was most significant in the Perception 
Regression Test Model and the Attitude Regression Test Model.   
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R2 Change = .253
p < .001
A subcomponent of 
successful change
Predictor Variables
(Inputs to the change process)
Dependent Variable
(Outcome predicted by regression)
 
Figure 25.   Comparison of Perception Regression Test Model and Attitude Regression 
Test Model70 
 
In an environment with limited resources, it is critical for management to identify 
areas for investment that will maximize return.  This holds true whether trying to identify 
new technologies in a manufacturing environment or trying to change the culture in an 
organization.  The relationships in the models presented help to identify where the NAE 
could best improve upon its change management efforts and if necessary, where to look 
at further investment in the process.  Discussion of suggested improvements will be based 
both on model outcomes and subjective observations during site visits. 
 
                                                 
70 Number to the left of the predictor variables indicate unstandardized regression coefficients and p 
values. 
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VII. FINAL COMMENTS 
The level of access granted to the researchers was remarkable and indicated that 
this study was of interest to the participating commands for a number of reasons.  First, 
many were in the midst of reorganization under the new FRC concept and were 
struggling to understand their new roles and responsibilities within that structure.  Many 
felt that anything gleaned from this study was well worth the investment of their time to 
support the research.   
 
A. OBSERVATIONS 
1. Various members of the units visited were asked if they knew what their 
new organizational structure was going to look like.  Few could respond with any 
measure of certainty.  Through research of the FRC design, we learned that preliminary 
organizational charts were created, but it appeared that they have not been very widely 
disseminated.     
This is a concern because the lack of dissemination represents an impediment to 
the flow of information.  As demonstrated in the regression models, the predictor 
variables leadership support of AIRspeed, communication, and incentives tied to change, 
all were positively correlated with information.  Of particular note is the response by the 
Marine Corps in the control model (B = .424, p < .001).  The response indicates that the 
Marine Corps, for some reason, feels that they do not have access to or have not been 
included in either the planning or dissemination of information regarding the FRC 
implementation.  Subjectively, the tenor of the commands visited would support the 
conclusions.  Continued analysis of the information flow to the Marine Corps is 
suggested.     
 
2. Questions remained unanswered about funding protocols.  Intermediate 
level maintenance units are funded through Mission Funding while the Depots utilize the 
Navy Working Capital Fund.  Fusing these two organizations within the FRC presents 
 70
fiscal management challenges that, if already worked out, their solutions are not widely 
understood by those responsible for implementation.   
 
3. Overall, many voiced some degree of frustration over the lack of guidance 
in the implementation. They all seemed very impressed with and willing to apply the 
tenets of AIRspeed to their work.  For the purpose of this study, the application of the 
AIRspeed program was considered as a surrogate indicator for an organization’s 
commitment to change.  Invariably, some units viewed the program as more critical to 
their success than others.  
a. The survey data brought out a distinction between the Navy’s perception 
of AIRspeed and the Marine Corps’, which could account for their different reactions.  
Two distinct impediments were identified to the Marines’ adoption of AIRspeed and 
ultimately to their integration into the FRCs.  First, the Marines showed a high degree of 
correlation with understanding their mission statements, yet they felt that AIRspeed 
offered them little advantage over their present condition.  Second, they perceived a lack 
of leadership support of AIRspeed.  With leadership support of AIRspeed being upheld as 
the most significant predictor variable in the Organization Commitment to Change 
Model, it can be reasoned that the Marine Corps as an organization has not yet fully 
embraced the concept of either AIRspeed or the underway integration. 
b. It is recommended that further research be conducted to discern the reason 
behind the disconnection between the Navy and the Marine Corp on the subject of 
integration.  From a subjective standpoint, the impression left on the researchers by the 
MALS was that the Marines were not included in the FRC implementation planning 
process, nor were they consulted over the potential impact that the integration would have 
on their organizations as they significantly differed from those of the Navy.   
 
4. The existence of parallel chains of command within work centers may be a 
cause for conflict.  Currently, military personnel report to their military supervisor, while 
civilian personnel report to their civilian supervisor, all within the same work center 
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space.  The focus of the military supervisor is on production, while the Depot level 
artisan is there to perform interdiction of material that would have been destined to be 
classified as Beyond Capable Maintenance (BCM) by the military worker.  A conflict 
may arise over the use of shared resources.  The possibility even exists for the two 
parallel chains to compete with one another.  Additionally, while speaking with both 
military supervisors and their civilian counterparts, it became obvious that the civilian 
component at the Depots had experienced a lesser degree of exposure to the entire 
implementation concept as well as the rationale behind the development of FRCs.  In 
fact, it was brought to the researcher’s attention that without this understanding by the 
civilian element, many of the hourly work force would likely view the integration as a 
threat to their job security.   
 
a. While the existence of parallel reporting structures does not necessarily 
mean there will be problems, the potential exists.  For instance, the Navy was highly 
correlated with perceiving leadership support of AIRspeed and the overall change effort, 
whereas the civilian workers knew so little about the program that they couldn’t really 
comment on it.   
b.  It is recommended that this study be expanded to focus on whether or not 
this is a widespread problem throughout the Depots or if it was geographically isolated to 
the units studied.  For the surveyed units, it is recommended that they address the flow of 
information within their organizations with a focus on more effectively getting 
information down to the worker on the floor.  One of the key concepts of having Depot 
level artisans work side-by-side with military personnel is to transfer their knowledge to 
the military workforce.  This is not likely to happen as long as the artisans do not 
understand why they are there, or worse yet, perceive their jobs to be in jeopardy due to 
the integration of their work centers.     
 
5. The initiative to integrate units at the FRC level seemed to have been 
launched without a wide degree of Fleet participation or stakeholder involvement.  The 
methods and goals of integration did not appear to be widely understood.  This 
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observation was magnified by the Marine Corps responses.  The move to integrate was 
begun before the method, goals and end state were truly understood. 
 
6. A significant degree of enthusiasm for AIRspeed was noted at the E6 and 
below level.  The integration, and one if it’s key enablers – AIRspeed, have presented 
what this group perceives to be an opportunity.  Understanding and implementing 
AIRspeed has become not only a mandate, but an art if mastered.  Informal interviews 
indicated that many E5-E6 personnel viewed understanding AIRspeed and gaining 
qualification as a Green-belt or Black-belt as advantageous to their careers, with some 
actually perceiving it as a highly sought after position.  In contrast, subjective discussion 
at the unit level indicated there were some Chief Petty Officers that had a more 
pessimistic take on the program.  Some even indicating that AIRspeed may by the next 
passing “trend” in Naval aviation, and that they seemed less than commitment to the 
process.  Again, it must be stressed that this was gleaned through informal conversation 
with unit personnel and not supported empirically by the survey study.  Additionally, a 
number of E5 and E6 personnel seemed empowered to fill the void left by more senior 
“doubters” of the process.  This made sense as the survey data also indicated a perceived 
connection between understanding AIRSpeed and promotability.   
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
We feel that a number of measures could be used to help ease the integration of 
FRCs into the Fleet.  While it seems the NAE has launched somewhat of a media 
campaign of late, there is no substitute for early dissemination of information that would 
have allowed people time to adjust to the idea of change.  It is felt that while the 
information is getting out, it is not reaching its target audience right now.  The architects 
of the plan should also provide a venue for people to ask questions in order to help the 
workforce understand what the implication of the change will mean to them.  In the case 
of the FRCs, the Navy and Marine Corp could consider publishing a FRC implementation 
guide book that would be available to all levels of workers within the FRC structure.  
This may help to address the communication problems that were evident both with the 
civilian employees at the Depots and the Marine Corps units.   
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Next, NAVAIR could consider further implementation using a series approach 
vice the parallel approach that it is currently pursuing.  All six FRC regions are 
undergoing change simultaneously, although they are in different stages.  The lead region 
appears to be FRC Southwest.  However, FRC Southwest has not progressed far enough 
through its transition to act as a guide for the rest of the FRC regions to follow.  It is 
recommended that their implementation be allowed to mature and then extract best 
practices from their experience and disseminated them throughout the Fleet.   
Overall, junior personnel seemed much more attuned to the implementation of 
AIRspeed than the FRC integration.  The researchers felt that below the Commissioned 
Officer level, the concept of FRC integration was not widely understood.  It is 
recommended that the NAE reassess who their stakeholders are in this change process 
and pursue a more participative approach to planning the change.   
Pursued together, these recommendations could serve to address a number of the 
dependent variables that were proven in the regressions to have an impact on the overall 
change process.  It is believed that this topic requires more study that merits sponsorship 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY RESPONSES 
1.  I agree to participate in the survey
245 99.2 99.2 99.2































2.  Please indicate your branch of service
105 42.5 43.2 43.2
135 54.7 55.6 98.8






























2.  Please indicate your branch of service
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3.  Please indicate your current rank/rate/paygrade
1 .4 .4 .4
17 6.9 7.0 7.4
21 8.5 8.6 16.0
50 20.2 20.6 36.6
71 28.7 29.2 65.8
38 15.4 15.6 81.5
9 3.6 3.7 85.2
4 1.6 1.6 86.8
1 .4 .4 87.2
2 .8 .8 88.1
3 1.2 1.2 89.3
2 .8 .8 90.1
2 .8 .8 90.9
1 .4 .4 91.4
13 5.3 5.3 96.7
4 1.6 1.6 98.4
1 .4 .4 98.8


















































4.  Please select the menu item that best reflects your current type of duty
assignment
225 91.1 92.6 92.6
7 2.8 2.9 95.5
5 2.0 2.1 97.5
2 .8 .8 98.4



















4.  Please select the menu item that best reflects your current type of duty 
assignment















5.  Please indicate the response that best reflects your total years in service
(Military or Civil)
49 19.8 20.2 20.2
57 23.1 23.5 43.6
60 24.3 24.7 68.3
44 17.8 18.1 86.4



















5.  Please indicate the response that best reflects your total years in service 
(Military or Civil)















6.  Select the menu item that best reflects your current work assignement
33 13.4 13.6 13.6
18 7.3 7.4 21.0
24 9.7 9.9 30.9
22 8.9 9.1 39.9
3 1.2 1.2 41.2
77 31.2 31.7 72.8
23 9.3 9.5 82.3
11 4.5 4.5 86.8
1 .4 .4 87.2








































6.  Select the menu item that best reflects your current work assignement
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7.  You have read and understand Vision 2020
14 5.7 6.0 6.0
75 30.4 31.9 37.9
25 10.1 10.6 48.5
24 9.7 10.2 58.7



















7.  You have read and understand Vision 2020











7.  You have read and understand Vision 2020
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8.  You are familiar with the current initiative to restructure AIMDs/MALS and Depots
under the new FRC concept
40 16.2 17.0 17.0
129 52.2 54.9 71.9
23 9.3 9.8 81.7
8 3.2 3.4 85.1



















8.  You are familiar with the current initiative to restructure AIMDs/MALS and 
Depots under the new FRC concept












8.  You are familiar with the current initiative to restructure AIMDs/MALS and 
Depots under the new FRC concept
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9.  You know what your organization's mission statement says
49 19.8 20.9 20.9
145 58.7 61.7 82.6
12 4.9 5.1 87.7
8 3.2 3.4 91.1



















9.  You know what your organization's mission statement says









9.  You know what your organization's mission statement says
 84
10.  You have received training to help you better align your efforts to support the
concepts of AirSpeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma
55 22.3 23.4 23.4
127 51.4 54.0 77.4
29 11.7 12.3 89.8
17 6.9 7.2 97.0



















10.  You have received training to help you better align your efforts to support 
the concepts of AirSpeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma












10.  You have received training to help you better align your efforts to support 
the concepts of AirSpeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma
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11.  Your immediate supervisor explained the impact of Fleet Readiness Centers on
your job
41 16.6 17.4 17.4
122 49.4 51.9 69.4
34 13.8 14.5 83.8
23 9.3 9.8 93.6



















11.  Your immediate supervisor explained the impact of Fleet Readiness 
Centers on your job












11.  Your immediate supervisor explained the impact of Fleet Readiness 
Centers on your job
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12.  Your supervisor explained to you how your job may be impacted when the
Navy/Marine Corps moves to two levels of maintenance
29 11.7 12.4 12.4
118 47.8 50.6 63.1
42 17.0 18.0 81.1
24 9.7 10.3 91.4



















12.  Your supervisor explained to you how your job may be impacted when the 
Navy/Marine Corps moves to two levels of maintenance












12.  Your supervisor explained to you how your job may be impacted when 
the Navy/Marine Corps moves to two levels of maintenance
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3.  You feel you have adequate training right now to be effective in your role within the
FRC
25 10.1 10.6 10.6
107 43.3 45.5 56.2
46 18.6 19.6 75.7
24 9.7 10.2 86.0



















13.  You feel you have adequate training right now to be effective in your role 
within the FRC











13.  You feel you have adequate training right now to be effective in your role 
within the FRC
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14.  You have attended a 'Captain's Call' or training event that allowed you to
ask your leadership questions regarding the potential changes to your unit
under the new FRC construct
111 44.9 47.2 47.2
















14.  You have attended a 'Captain's Call' or training event that allowed you to 
ask your leadership questions regarding the potential changes to your unit 













14.  You have attended a 'Captain's Call' or training event that allowed you to 
ask your leadership questions regarding the potential changes to your unit 
under the new FRC construct
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15.  If so, the 'Captain's Call' or training adequately addressed your concerns
15 6.1 13.4 13.4
64 25.9 57.1 70.5
17 6.9 15.2 85.7
9 3.6 8.0 93.8



















15.  If so, the 'Captain's Call' or training adequately addressed your concerns












15.  If so, the 'Captain's Call' or training adequately addressed your concerns
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6.  You have encountered rumors about the potential benefits or risks of moving from
three levels of maintenance to two levels of maintenance
14 5.7 6.2 6.2
114 46.2 50.2 56.4
51 20.6 22.5 78.9
23 9.3 10.1 89.0



















16.  You have encountered rumors about the potential benefits or risks of 
moving from three levels of maintenance to two levels of maintenance












16.  You have encountered rumors about the potential benefits or risks of 
moving from three levels of maintenance to two levels of maintenance
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17.  You see your LCPO/NCOIC/Supervisor in your workcenter
159 64.4 70.0 70.0
41 16.6 18.1 88.1
20 8.1 8.8 96.9





























17.  You see your LCPO/NCOIC/Supervisor in your workcenter
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18.  You have encountered rumors about the potential benefits or risks to the
implementation of Fleet Readiness Centers
17 6.9 7.5 7.5
111 44.9 48.9 56.4
56 22.7 24.7 81.1
15 6.1 6.6 87.7



















18.  You have encountered rumors about the potential benefits or risks to the 
implementation of Fleet Readiness Centers











18.  You have encountered rumors about the potential benefits or risks to the 
implementation of Fleet Readiness Centers
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19.  You see your Division Officer or Department Head in your workcenter
79 32.0 34.8 34.8
78 31.6 34.4 69.2
52 21.1 22.9 92.1





























19.  You see your Division Officer or Department Head in your workcenter
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20.  You feel free to offer your ideas on how to improve processes at work
67 27.1 29.5 29.5
123 49.8 54.2 83.7
18 7.3 7.9 91.6
12 4.9 5.3 96.9



















20.  You feel free to offer your ideas on how to improve processes at work












20.  You feel free to offer your ideas on how to improve processes at work
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21.  You were consulted on the impact of moving from three levels of maintenance to
two
13 5.3 5.7 5.7
66 26.7 29.1 34.8
78 31.6 34.4 69.2
47 19.0 20.7 89.9



















21.  You were consulted on the impact of moving from three levels of 
maintenance to two














22.  You feel your input was carefully considered prior to NAVAIR's commitment to the
FRC Concept
5 2.0 2.2 2.2
45 18.2 19.8 22.0
59 23.9 26.0 48.0
59 23.9 26.0 74.0



















22.  You feel your input was carefully considered prior to NAVAIR's 
commitment to the FRC Concept









22.  You feel your input was carefully considered prior to NAVAIR's 
commitment to the FRC Concept
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3.  You feel free to voice your opinion of the proposed FRC plan to those senior to you
30 12.1 13.2 13.2
131 53.0 57.7 70.9
29 11.7 12.8 83.7
17 6.9 7.5 91.2



















23.  You feel free to voice your opinion of the proposed FRC plan to those 
senior to you
















24.  You attended working groups (or similar meetings) whose focus was on
discussing the impact of the new FRC structure prior to NAVAIR's commitment to the
concept
9 3.6 4.0 4.0
56 22.7 24.7 28.6
85 34.4 37.4 66.1
51 20.6 22.5 88.5



















24.  You attended working groups (or similar meetings) whose focus was on 
discussing the impact of the new FRC structure prior to NAVAIR's commitment 
to the concept










24.  You attended working groups (or similar meetings) whose focus was on 
discussing the impact of the new FRC structure prior to NAVAIR's 




25.  Your leadership has adequately addressed the possible career impact to those
affected by the implementation of the FRCs
11 4.5 4.8 4.8
75 30.4 33.0 37.9
69 27.9 30.4 68.3
39 15.8 17.2 85.5



















25.  Your leadership has adequately addressed the possible career impact to 
those affected by the implementation of the FRCs










25.  Your leadership has adequately addressed the possible career impact to 
those affected by the implementation of the FRCs
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26.  You would characterize your leaderships committement to the implimentation
of Fleet Readiness Centers as
56 22.7 24.7 24.7
95 38.5 41.9 66.5

















26.  You would characterize your leaderships committement to the 












26.  You would characterize your leaderships committement to the 
implimentation of Fleet Readiness Centers as
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27.  If I can not successfully transform my organization we will not be able to meet the
objectives of the Naval Aviation Enterprise
18 7.3 7.9 7.9
76 30.8 33.5 41.4
59 23.9 26.0 67.4
13 5.3 5.7 73.1



















27.  If I can not successfully transform my organization we will not be able to 
meet the objectives of the Naval Aviation Enterprise










27.  If I can not successfully transform my organization we will not be able to 
meet the objectives of the Naval Aviation Enterprise
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28.  I believe my next performance evaluation/FITREP will be impacted by my ability to
successfully transform my organization under the new FRC plan
18 7.3 7.9 7.9
81 32.8 35.7 43.6
49 19.8 21.6 65.2
23 9.3 10.1 75.3



















28.  I believe my next performance evaluation/FITREP will be impacted by my 
ability to successfully transform my organization under the new FRC plan










28.  I believe my next performance evaluation/FITREP will be impacted by my 
ability to successfully transform my organization under the new FRC plan
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29.  The benefits of AIRspeed sound great, but the effort to implement the program is
not worth the reward
29 11.7 12.8 12.8
57 23.1 25.2 38.1
78 31.6 34.5 72.6
32 13.0 14.2 86.7




















29.  The benefits of AIRspeed sound great, but the effort to implement the 
program is not worth the reward










29.  The benefits of AIRspeed sound great, but the effort to implement the 
program is not worth the reward
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30.  I believe AIRspeed is having
45 18.2 19.9 19.9
101 40.9 44.7 64.6
54 21.9 23.9 88.5








no impact on readiness












30.  I believe AIRspeed is having
a negative impact on 
readiness
no impact on readinessa moderate positive 
impact on readiness












30.  I believe AIRspeed is having
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31.  My performance will be evaluated on how well I can implement AIRspeed at my
command
30 12.1 13.3 13.3
101 40.9 44.7 58.0
50 20.2 22.1 80.1
9 3.6 4.0 84.1



















31.  My performance will be evaluated on how well I can implement AIRspeed 
at my command















32.  AIRspeed has little impact on operations at my command
12 4.9 5.3 5.3
45 18.2 19.9 25.2
106 42.9 46.9 72.1
41 16.6 18.1 90.3



















32.  AIRspeed has little impact on operations at my command















33.  I have participated in a 'Boots on the Ground' event
73 29.6 32.3 32.3

































34.  I found my time at the event to be
13 5.3 17.6 17.6
49 19.8 66.2 83.8



























34.  I found my time at the event to be
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35.  I have read about the development of Fleet Readiness Centers in the base paper,
Approach, Mech, or other military periodicals
8 3.2 3.8 3.8
74 30.0 34.7 38.5
73 29.6 34.3 72.8
27 10.9 12.7 85.4



















35.  I have read about the development of Fleet Readiness Centers in the 
base paper, Approach, Mech, or other military periodicals










35.  I have read about the development of Fleet Readiness Centers in the base 
paper, Approach, Mech, or other military periodicals
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6.  My command is willing to send me for additional training in AIRspeed, TOC, LEAN,
Kaizen or Six Sigma?
45 18.2 21.1 21.1
102 41.3 47.9 69.0
18 7.3 8.5 77.5
12 4.9 5.6 83.1



















36.  My command is willing to send me for additional training in AIRspeed, 
TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma?











36.  My command is willing to send me for additional training in AIRspeed, 
TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma?
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37.  I know at least 1 person in my work center that has received some training in
AIRspeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma?
79 32.0 37.1 37.1
117 47.4 54.9 92.0
5 2.0 2.3 94.4
3 1.2 1.4 95.8



















37.  I know at least 1 person in my work center that has received some training 
in AIRspeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma?












37.  I know at least 1 person in my work center that has received some training 
in AIRspeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma?
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38.  I don't know of any person in my work center that has received training in
AirSpeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma
8 3.2 3.8 3.8
15 6.1 7.0 10.8
92 37.2 43.2 54.0
86 34.8 40.4 94.4



















38.  I don't know of any person in my work center that has received training in 
AirSpeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma











38.  I don't know of any person in my work center that has received training in 
AirSpeed, TOC, LEAN, Kaizen or Six Sigma
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39.  I am familiar with the terms 'Black belt' and 'Greenbelt' as they apply to AIRspeed
63 25.5 29.6 29.6
104 42.1 48.8 78.4
23 9.3 10.8 89.2
10 4.0 4.7 93.9



















39.  I am familiar with the terms 'Black belt' and 'Greenbelt' as they apply to 
AIRspeed















40.  I beleive that 'Blackbelt' or 'Greenbelt' training
68 27.5 31.9 31.9
43 17.4 20.2 52.1




will be critical to my
professional growth














40.  I beleive that 'Blackbelt' or 'Greenbelt' training
will eventually become requiredwill not impact my advancement 
potential












40.  I beleive that 'Blackbelt' or 'Greenbelt' training
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41.  I don't have the training required to work side-by-side with Depot-level artisans
19 7.7 8.9 8.9
34 13.8 16.0 24.9
90 36.4 42.3 67.1
44 17.8 20.7 87.8



















41.  I don't have the training required to work side-by-side with Depot-level 
artisans















42.  I feel my current level of training would allow me to work side-by-side with
Depot-level artisans productively
39 15.8 18.3 18.3
116 47.0 54.5 72.8
18 7.3 8.5 81.2
10 4.0 4.7 85.9



















42.  I feel my current level of training would allow me to work side-by-side with 
Depot-level artisans productively
















43.  It's been my experience that Depot-level artisans rarely take the time to provide
Fleet personnel meaningful OJT
21 8.5 9.9 9.9
42 17.0 19.7 29.6
63 25.5 29.6 59.2
19 7.7 8.9 68.1



















43.  It's been my experience that Depot-level artisans rarely take the time to 
provide Fleet personnel meaningful OJT










43.  It's been my experience that Depot-level artisans rarely take the time to 
provide Fleet personnel meaningful OJT
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44.  It's been my experience that Fleet personnel are not prepared to handle the more
in-depth maintenance performed by Depot-level artisans
13 5.3 6.1 6.1
37 15.0 17.4 23.5
90 36.4 42.3 65.7
41 16.6 19.2 85.0



















44.  It's been my experience that Fleet personnel are not prepared to handle 
the more in-depth maintenance performed by Depot-level artisans











44.  It's been my experience that Fleet personnel are not prepared to handle 
the more in-depth maintenance performed by Depot-level artisans
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45.  I trust that my leadership has well analyzed the benefits of moving to the new FRC
concept and that we will experience some degree of benefit
20 8.1 9.4 9.4
108 43.7 50.7 60.1
25 10.1 11.7 71.8
12 4.9 5.6 77.5



















45.  I trust that my leadership has well analyzed the benefits of moving to the 
new FRC concept and that we will experience some degree of benefit












45.  I trust that my leadership has well analyzed the benefits of moving to the 
new FRC concept and that we will experience some degree of benefit
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46.  I've been in the Navy/Marie Corps/Civil Service long enough to realize that
AIRspeed will be a passing phase like TQL/TQM
24 9.7 11.3 11.3
39 15.8 18.3 29.6
72 29.1 33.8 63.4
21 8.5 9.9 73.2



















46.  I've been in the Navy/Marie Corps/Civil Service long enough to realize 
that AIRspeed will be a passing phase like TQL/TQM










46.  I've been in the Navy/Marie Corps/Civil Service long enough to realize that 
AIRspeed will be a passing phase like TQL/TQM
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47.  I believe that AIRSpeed and its tenant concepts such as Lean, Six Sigma, Kaizen
and TOC are here to stay
37 15.0 17.4 17.4
87 35.2 40.8 58.2
25 10.1 11.7 70.0
19 7.7 8.9 78.9



















47.  I believe that AIRSpeed and its tenant concepts such as Lean, Six Sigma, 
Kaizen and TOC are here to stay











47.  I believe that AIRSpeed and its tenant concepts such as Lean, Six Sigma, 
Kaizen and TOC are here to stay
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48.  If I don't apply the tenants of AIRspeed to my daily work I will never get promoted
14 5.7 6.6 6.6
41 16.6 19.2 25.8
83 33.6 39.0 64.8
31 12.6 14.6 79.3



















48.  If I don't apply the tenants of AIRspeed to my daily work I will never get 
promoted














49.  If I don't understand AIRspeed I'm looked down upon at my command
18 7.3 8.5 8.5
63 25.5 29.6 38.0
72 29.1 33.8 71.8
25 10.1 11.7 83.6



















49.  If I don't understand AIRspeed I'm looked down upon at my command










49.  If I don't understand AIRspeed I'm looked down upon at my command
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50.  I disagree with the direction that AIRspeed is taking us, but I have no choice but to
comply - my career is on the line.
18 7.3 8.5 8.5
38 15.4 17.8 26.3
98 39.7 46.0 72.3
29 11.7 13.6 85.9




















50.  I disagree with the direction that AIRspeed is taking us, but I have no 
choice but to comply - my career is on the line.











50.  I disagree with the direction that AIRspeed is taking us, but I have no 
choice but to comply - my career is on the line.
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51.  I know at least one person in my command who I consider to be a subject matter
expert in AIRspeed
59 23.9 27.7 27.7
104 42.1 48.8 76.5
15 6.1 7.0 83.6
16 6.5 7.5 91.1



















51.  I know at least one person in my command who I consider to be a subject 
matter expert in AIRspeed











51.  I know at least one person in my command who I consider to be a subject 
matter expert in AIRspeed
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52.  I know a number of people in my command who I consider to be subject matter
experts in AIRspeed
35 14.2 16.4 16.4
98 39.7 46.0 62.4
34 13.8 16.0 78.4
23 9.3 10.8 89.2



















52.  I know a number of people in my command who I consider to be subject 
matter experts in AIRspeed











52.  I know a number of people in my command who I consider to be subject 
matter experts in AIRspeed
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53.  My immediate supervisor is able to provide us training on AIRspeed that is easily
understandable
12 4.9 5.6 5.6
89 36.0 41.8 47.4
55 22.3 25.8 73.2
28 11.3 13.1 86.4



















53.  My immediate supervisor is able to provide us training on AIRspeed that 
is easily understandable















54.  I consider my immediate supervisor a subject matter expert in AIRspeed
9 3.6 4.2 4.2
53 21.5 24.9 29.1
79 32.0 37.1 66.2
39 15.8 18.3 84.5



















54.  I consider my immediate supervisor a subject matter expert in AIRspeed










54.  I consider my immediate supervisor a subject matter expert in AIRspeed
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55.  My immediate supervisor supports the AIRSpeed program
36 14.6 16.9 16.9
97 39.3 45.5 62.4
20 8.1 9.4 71.8
13 5.3 6.1 77.9



















55.  My immediate supervisor supports the AIRSpeed program











55.  My immediate supervisor supports the AIRSpeed program
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56.  My immediate supervisor while not an expert on AIRspeed, knows where to go
and find answers  when we need them.
37 15.0 17.4 17.4
131 53.0 61.5 78.9
17 6.9 8.0 86.9
6 2.4 2.8 89.7



















56.  My immediate supervisor while not an expert on AIRspeed, knows where 
to go and find answers  when we need them.









56.  My immediate supervisor while not an expert on AIRspeed, knows where 
to go and find answers  when we need them.
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57.  Initially, my command instituted AIRspeed in one program area only
13 5.3 6.1 6.1
56 22.7 26.3 32.4
47 19.0 22.1 54.5
19 7.7 8.9 63.4



















57.  Initially, my command instituted AIRspeed in one program area only










57.  Initially, my command instituted AIRspeed in one program area only
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8.  After its initial success, we instituted the tenants of AIRspeed throughout all of our
processes
17 6.9 8.0 8.0
94 38.1 44.1 52.1
29 11.7 13.6 65.7
9 3.6 4.2 70.0



















58.  After its initial success, we instituted the tenants of AIRspeed throughout 
all of our processes











58.  After its initial success, we instituted the tenants of AIRspeed throughout 
all of our processes
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59.  I have seen too many barriers to the implementation of AIRspeed at my command
9 3.6 4.2 4.2
64 25.9 30.0 34.3
81 32.8 38.0 72.3
16 6.5 7.5 79.8



















59.  I have seen too many barriers to the implementation of AIRspeed at my 
command














60.  I clearly understand the mission and vision of my organization or unit
40 16.2 18.8 18.8
128 51.8 60.1 78.9
18 7.3 8.5 87.3
4 1.6 1.9 89.2





















60.  I clearly understand the mission and vision of my organization or unit









60.  I clearly understand the mission and vision of my organization or unit
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1.  I understand the role that I play in assisting my organization or unit in achieving its
mission
47 19.0 22.1 22.1
129 52.2 60.6 82.6
13 5.3 6.1 88.7
5 2.0 2.3 91.1



















61.  I understand the role that I play in assisting my organization or unit in 
achieving its mission













62.  I am committed to the current direction of my organization or unit
50 20.2 23.5 23.5
133 53.8 62.4 85.9
8 3.2 3.8 89.7
7 2.8 3.3 93.0



















62.  I am committed to the current direction of my organization or unit









62.  I am committed to the current direction of my organization or unit
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63.  I am proud of my organization/unit
59 23.9 27.7 27.7
114 46.2 53.5 81.2
15 6.1 7.0 88.3
14 5.7 6.6 94.8



















63.  I am proud of my organization/unit












63.  I am proud of my organization/unit
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64.  I feel extremely loyal to my organization/unit
53 21.5 24.9 24.9
114 46.2 53.5 78.4
22 8.9 10.3 88.7
8 3.2 3.8 92.5



















64.  I feel extremely loyal to my organization/unit












64.  I feel extremely loyal to my organization/unit
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65.  I feel very little loyalty to my organization/unit
12 4.9 5.6 5.6
28 11.3 13.1 18.8
103 41.7 48.4 67.1
55 22.3 25.8 93.0



















65.  I feel very little loyalty to my organization/unit











65.  I feel very little loyalty to my organization/unit
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66.  I'd care more about the effectiveness of my organization or unit if the leadership
showed more commitment to my own needs
24 9.7 11.3 11.3
52 21.1 24.4 35.7
87 35.2 40.8 76.5
23 9.3 10.8 87.3



















66.  I'd care more about the effectiveness of my organization or unit if the 
leadership showed more commitment to my own needs











66.  I'd care more about the effectiveness of my organization or unit if the 
leadership showed more commitment to my own needs
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67.  I rarely seek out information about other job opportunities
10 4.0 4.7 4.7
60 24.3 28.2 32.9
97 39.3 45.5 78.4
28 11.3 13.1 91.5



















67.  I rarely seek out information about other job opportunities











67.  I rarely seek out information about other job opportunities
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68.  I will likely seek another job this year
26 10.5 12.2 12.2
46 18.6 21.6 33.8
82 33.2 38.5 72.3
34 13.8 16.0 88.3



















68.  I will likely seek another job this year










68.  I will likely seek another job this year
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69.  Communication from my immediate supervisor is always timely
29 11.7 13.6 13.6
134 54.3 62.9 76.5
27 10.9 12.7 89.2
12 4.9 5.6 94.8



















69.  Communication from my immediate supervisor is always timely









69.  Communication from my immediate supervisor is always timely
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70.  I always feel like I know what is going on in my organization or unit
12 4.9 5.6 5.6
99 40.1 46.5 52.1
70 28.3 32.9 85.0
21 8.5 9.9 94.8



















70.  I always feel like I know what is going on in my organization or unit











70.  I always feel like I know what is going on in my organization or unit
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71.  I always trust my leaders
21 8.5 9.9 9.9
92 37.2 43.2 53.1
61 24.7 28.6 81.7
22 8.9 10.3 92.0



















71.  I always trust my leaders











71.  I always trust my leaders
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72.  Division and Department leaders always take the time to explain the reasoning
behind critical decisions
15 6.1 7.0 7.0
102 41.3 47.9 54.9
56 22.7 26.3 81.2
28 11.3 13.1 94.4



















72.  Division and Department leaders always take the time to explain the 
reasoning behind critical decisions











72.  Division and Department leaders always take the time to explain the 
reasoning behind critical decisions
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73.  I trust my Departmental and Divisional leaders
31 12.6 14.6 14.6
113 45.7 53.1 67.6
33 13.4 15.5 83.1
21 8.5 9.9 93.0



















73.  I trust my Departmental and Divisional leaders












73.  I trust my Departmental and Divisional leaders
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74.  I believe my Departmental/Divisional leaders have good intentions
37 15.0 17.4 17.4
139 56.3 65.3 82.6
13 5.3 6.1 88.7
9 3.6 4.2 93.0



















74.  I believe my Departmental/Divisional leaders have good intentions









74.  I believe my Departmental/Divisional leaders have good intentions
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75.  I am suspicious of my senior leaders' motives
19 7.7 8.9 8.9
36 14.6 16.9 25.8
100 40.5 46.9 72.8
37 15.0 17.4 90.1



















75.  I am suspicious of my senior leaders' motives











75.  I am suspicious of my senior leaders' motives
 
 150
76.  I am given real opportunities to improve my skills
28 11.3 13.1 13.1
125 50.6 58.7 71.8
31 12.6 14.6 86.4
13 5.3 6.1 92.5



















76.  I am given real opportunities to improve my skills












76.  I am given real opportunities to improve my skills
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77.  I receive ongoing training that directly impacts how well I accomplish my job
25 10.1 11.7 11.7
113 45.7 53.1 64.8
45 18.2 21.1 85.9
16 6.5 7.5 93.4



















77.  I receive ongoing training that directly impacts how well I accomplish my 
job
















78.  My command is concerned about my well-being
27 10.9 12.7 12.7
119 48.2 55.9 68.5
21 8.5 9.9 78.4
18 7.3 8.5 86.9



















78.  My command is concerned about my well-being












78.  My command is concerned about my well-being
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79.  My command shows very little concern for my well-being
16 6.5 7.5 7.5
32 13.0 15.0 22.5
101 40.9 47.4 70.0
40 16.2 18.8 88.7



















79.  My command shows very little concern for my well-being











79.  My command shows very little concern for my well-being
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80.  My command values my contributions
25 10.1 11.7 11.7
114 46.2 53.5 65.3
25 10.1 11.7 77.0
14 5.7 6.6 83.6



















80.  My command values my contributions



















APPENDIX B. SITE VISITS 
A. Site Visit Notes (Navy) 
 
Notes dated October 25-26, 2006 
Can you describe the methodology you have used to help transform the  
organization? 
- (teams, consultants, guidance from higher up) 
- Little guidance (almost non existent, in respect to FRC) 
- AIRspeed – more guidance.  Lots of material, certifications, encourage 
training at command.  Established Black belt who is now training others 
on a voluntary basis. 
 
What kind of barriers have you encountered to implementing the new FRC  
structure? 
- Largest barrier identified as lack of a plan by most asked this question. 
- Junior people encountered knew little about the plan.  More focused on 
task at hand. 
- Personnel more senior in pay grade (O4-O5) were aware of plans by 
NAVAIR, COMNAVAIRFOR, but acknowledged that information has 
been flowing slowly and expressed frustration over the many issues that 
had yet to be worked out (i.e. funding streams, organizational relationships 







What kind of reaction did you get from the CPO mess? 
- Mixed review.  Some skeptical or cynical as they have numerous 
changes of their careers (TQL,TQL, MBO etc…) 
 
What kind of reaction did you get from the junior enlisted? 
- Seem to lock onto the program.  E5 and E6 have been qualified, some 
much earlier than the more senior.   
- Officers interviewed voiced the view that understanding AIRspeed and 
even getting qualified as a Black belt or Greenbelt could be beneficial to 
the career of E5, E6 personnel.   
- E5, E6 personnel encountered stated enthusiasm for the program.  They 
could articulate the purpose of the program, their role in it (at the 
workceter level) and the benefits reaped by their work centers.  They also 
stated that they felt qualification as Green belt or Black belt could 
ultimately help them get promoted to Chief Petty Officer.  Noted their 
perception of incentives. 
 
Do you have greenbelts/black belts? 
- All Navy units visited had Green belts as a minimum.  One had a Black-  
belt. 
 
What pay grades? 





Is it a sought after position? 
- Question posed to E6.  Stated that he felt it was.  Also felt it was career 
enhancing and a way to distinguish himself from peers for promotion. 
 
Do you incetivize the program in some way? 
 -  Liberty / recognition (no) 
Are your people working side by side with Depot level artisans yet? 
- Yes – integrating first workceter.  Noted presence of military supervisor 
and civilian supervisor within same workceter.  Asked if either had 
noticed any issues with the side-by-side relationship.   
- Military noted no difficulty working with civilian artisans.  Looked 
forward to the opportunity to possibly learn something from more 
experienced people.  Did note that things were a little “weird” at first.  
Generally stated that it would take time to get used to each other, but 
didn’t anticipate any problem.  Also stated the anticipated control of 
his/her military subordinates (i.e. they will not fall under civilian 
supervision within the workceter). 
- Depot level artisans indicated more discomfort from the situation than the 
military.  Artisan (speaking on behalf of his workceter) noted that they 
weren’t sure what to make of the move at first.  In fact, when questions 
about the FRC integration, he didn’t seem to really understand what was 
going on.  Artisan noted that there was an initial perception that their jobs 
could be impacted by the integration of work centers.  Developed the 
impression that they may be somewhat fear job security.  If they teach the 
military members their skill sets, they become less valuable.  Civilians’ 
interaction not incentivized properly.  Something that could be corrected 
through better communication and a creative incentive program.   
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- The military should find a way no not only incentivize the artisans BCM 
interdiction abilities, but incentivize their role as trainers and mentors for 
their trade. 
 
Do any of the enlisted think they are going to lose their jobs? 
- Never go the impression that the junior enlisted perceived the possibility  
of losing their jobs due to the integrations.  More senior personnel  
acknowledged that some degree of downsizing was likely. 
 
Recommendation – Handbook for change (FRC integration) 
Noted first I/D integrated work center at FRC Southwest. 
Didn’t see any incentive alignment 
 
 
B. Site Visit Notes (Marine Corps) 
 
Conversation notes taken on 26 and 27 October 2006, with personnel from each 
of the junior enlisted, Non-Commissioned Officers, Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
and Officers from the three MALS that participated in the survey.  
 
NR = Non rate (junior enlisted) 
NCO = Non Commissioned Officer 
SNCO = Staff Non Commissioned Officer 
O = Commissioned Officer 
 
1. Can you describe the methodology you have used to help transform the 
organization? 
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    (Teams, consultants, guidance from higher up) 
NR1. We have AIRspeed office in the head quarters building.  
NR2.  We have AIRspeed office and CNAF has been here. 
NCO1. Teams visit from higher and we have AIRSpeed office. 
NCO2. We have AIRspeed office that trains the squadron. 
SNCO1. We train with the AIRspeed shop and CNAF came here twice. 
SNCO2. We have AIRspeed training from the AIRspeed office. 
O1. The AIRspeed office and Wing, and CNAF are all involved in the  
transformation. 
O2. We have implemented and AIRSpeed office and routinely conduct  
training. 
 
2. What kind of barriers have you encountered to implementing the new FRC 
structure? 
 NR1. Some people want the change and some don’t. 
 NR2. Most of squadron is deployed and we are attached to this one. 
 NCO1. Any change to the way of doing business has barriers. 
 NCO2. We do what the C.O. tells his officers and SNCOs. 
SNCO1. We don’t see that yet with the MALS for a while. 
SNCO2. I think the Navy forgot about the Marines and they way MALS  
are different from AIMDs.  We deploy on ships and on land. 
O1. Getting Marines on board to a new way of thinking and doing our  
mission. 
O2. None so far since we still have our mission. 
 160
 
3. What kind of reaction did you get from the CPO (SNCOs) mess? 
NR1. Most just want to take care of their Marines and support the C.O. to  
move it that way. 
 NR2. Most support it but publicly but I don’t think so personally. 
 NCO1. I think all are on board if they are squared away SNCOs. 
 NCO2. I know some hate it and others like it. 
SNCO1. Some resistance and some support. 
SNCO2. Some of us with experience think it is the flavor of the week and  
others think we can get some good out of it until the next money  
saver comes along. 
O1. They will for the most part be the ones driving the main effort to the  
Marines they lead. 
O2. The SNCOs are our mid level management and they are humping up  
the hill every day. 
 
4. What kind of reaction did you get from the junior enlisted? 
 NR1. I am just learning my MOS so this is okay with me. 
 NR2. We just wan to do our jobs right. 
 NCO1. They do what is expected of them. 
 NCO2. They are Marines and Marines follow orders. 
SNCO1. They are for it. 
SNCO2. They will do what our directives tell us. 
O1. Most are motivated and easily accept the new direction. 
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O2.  I believe the hard chargers are seeing the importance of the  
implementations. 
 









How many?  
NR1. I don’t know. 
NR2. I don’t know. 
NCO1. At least four in every division 
 NCO2. At least 10 to 20. 
SNCO1. Not sure. 
SNCO2. A couple in each division. 
O1. All divisions are represented. 
O2.  My division has four and other divisions have the same, I believe. 
 
What pay grades?   
NR1. Officers and SNCOs.  
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NR2. Mostly NCOs and SNCOs. 
NCO1. Officers, SNCOs, and NCOs 
 NCO2. SNCOs and a few NCOs. 
SNCO1. NCOs and SNCOs and a couple officers. 
SNCO2. Officers, SNCOs and NCOs. 
O1. Officers, SNCOs and NCOs. 
O2. NCOs and higher. 
 
6. Is it a sought after position?  
NR1. I think so. 
NR2. I don’t know. 
NCO1. I believe so. 
 NCO2. No, I don’t want it. 
SNCO1. Yes, like any qualification is. 
SNCO2. Yes. 
O1. Yes. 
O2. Of course. 
 
7. Do you get incentives for being a qualified in the program in some way? 
Liberty / recognition?   
NR1. I don’t think so. 
NR2. Probably a line on the fitrep. 
NCO1. None that I can think of. 
 NCO2. Fitrep line. 
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SNCO1. Section I in Fitrep and maybe for a meritorious promotion board. 
SNCO2. Pride and respect of those they train. 
O1. The additional duties block on the performance report. 
O2. Separate you from your peers during evaluations. 
 
8. You don’t have a NADEP.  Have you had depot level artisans sent to your 
facility to     perform BCM interdictions?  
NR1. Some times the come over to help. 
NR2. I haven’t seen any. 
NCO1. If we request them they come over to help us out. 
 NCO2. Rarely. 
SNCO1. If requested. 
SNCO2. We don’t work with them much at the I-level. 
O1. We go to them with questions more than they come here to assist us.  
We also have Technical Representatives from NAESU. 
O2.  NAESU is our contact.  
 
9. If so, what was the working relationship between them and the enlisted?  
NR1. They teach us things we don’t know about fixing our gear. 
NR2. NA 
NCO1. Most were in the Navy or Marines and know their stuff. 
 NCO2. They are good to go. 
SNCO1. There are good ones and bad ones. 
SNCO2. They are who we go to when we need help. 
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O1. They are the experts who have more knowledge. 
O2.  Yes. 
 




 NCO2. No. 
 SNCO1. In the next five years none. 
SNCO2. Eventually. 
O1. We have taking very positive steps in the right direction. 
O2.  Yes. 
 
11. How has the average sailor (Marine) in the work center been educated on the 
new FRC concept of their changing role? (Additionally, of some artisans responsibilities 
via OJT).    
NR1. We have some training. 
NR2. I have heard about it but don’t care at this point since I am just out  
of "A" school. 
NCO1. Not any time soon. 
NCO2. The AIRspeed officers train us. 
SNCO1. Formal and informal training. 
SNCO2. Some read, some ask questions to the teams, when they came  
here and our AIRSpeed office has given training in the past. 
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O1.Yes. 
O2. We continue to train but people continually turn over. 
 
12. Try to locate the BRAC guidance that direct BCM interdiction.     
NR1. In the AIRspeed office. 
NR2. In QA or AIRspeed office. 
NCO1. .  In the AIRspeed office. 
NCO2. AIRspeed Officer. 
SNCO1. AIRspeed office. 
SNCO2. AIRspeed Officer 
O1. In the AIRspeed office. 
O2. AIRspeed Officer. 
 
13. Talk about the changing paradigm – no maintenance meetings. 
 NR1. The shop heads still go to the morning maintenance meetings. 
 NR2. We always have maintenance meetings. 
 NCO1. We still have maintenance meetings; I think they are needed for  
communication. 
 NCO2. Some one is always changing the way we get stuff done so they  
can get a medal. 
SNCO1. We have meetings still and I believe they are needed but Marines  
always do what is expected.  
SNCO2. More work so far. 
O1. The need for information from the leaders is always needed and a  
 166
quick maintenance meeting is a good thing.  Any change is tough  
but needed for continued improvements. 
O2.  We haven’t encountered much of a shift yet. 
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